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1 INTRODUCTION 
Finnish military doctrine from the 1960's onwards has been based 
on the concept of territorial defence. The goal of this non-offensive 
and entirely internally directed doctrine is the prevention of the 
subjugation of the state in all possible circumstances, to prevent 
an attack through Finland against any third party as well as 
preventing any invasion of Finnish territory. This goal is 
endeavored to be upheld through the maintenance of a level of 
military force whose very existence should suffice to keep Finland 
outside of serious military speculation. So that this preventative 
capability can be directed toward fulfilling its goal, it must be 
capable of a flexible use of military power during varying degrees 
of crisis situations. 
The subjugation of the state could be attempted through a 
surprise attack in conjunction with an enhanced use of stand-off 
weapons systems as well as special operations. In such 
circumstances air and sea defence as well as the protection of key 
objectives takes precedence over ground force activity. The 
defender's operations involving ground forces are to be well 
planned and straightforward. This is realized through employing 
the best troops in combination with long-range weapons systems 
aiming for the swiftest conclusion to the conflict. From a doctrinal 
point of view the operations of the ground forces cannot, with 
the exception of the flexible level of response to varying degrees 
of crisis situations, be adapted on a full-scale to the territorial 
defence doctrine. 
Hostile activity directed against a third party through Finland 
could be undertaken through the employment of air or sea forces 
or a combination of both. However, due to the breadth of the 
territory involved coupled with the territorial defence system 
used to defend it, it can be assumed that any potential invader 
would not be capable of achieving his long-term objective without 
the use of ground forces. Likewise, military operations directed 
towards the goal of invasion are not practical without instigating 
Major Markku Koli teaches military technology and weapons systems doctrine 
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wide-scale ground war activity. In such a setting the goals of 
Finnish military doctrine would be achieved through the repelling 
or subduing of any possible invader before he . reached any 
strategically decisive area. The main military doctrine is based 
on the use of ground forces which are complemented through 
the requisite use of operations carried out by the air and naval 
forces. For purposes of directing these combined operations 
Finland is divided into three regional commands, which are 
further subordinated into military areas, capable of initiating 
independent campaigns. 
The degree and range of modern military power called for 
in the models presented clearly diverge from each other. The 
examination of the territorial defence doctrine must be restricted 
to the handling of its adaptive capability for each individual 
threat scenario. From the point of view of ground force activity 
military operations aiming at invasion also form a wider totality 
to which this work is to be restricted. Owing to the fact that 
strategic weapons systems and special operations would typically 
be linked to a surprise attack, they are likewise omitted from the 
subject to be handled. 
The ongoing transition now taking place in the area of ground 
warfare also lays sufficient challenges regarding the development 
of Finnish ground combat doctrine. From the recent development 
trends that have come to light it can be concluded that the large-
scale introduction of new military weapon systems is clearly 
changing the basis of conventional ground combat doctrine whose 
current roots extend back to the Second World War. In formulating 
national defence strategy the disregarding of these new 
developments could prove fatal as the progression of events 
during the Persian Gulf war demonstrated. Though from a Finnish 
perspective the fighting capabilities of Iraq cannot be used as any 
comparable yardstick, one of the most important lessons learned 
from the war was that the basis of the destruction of Iraq's 
military forces was a totally false picture of the dimensions of 
modern ground combat and the equipment used to carry it out. 
The goal of this study is to investigate the possible ways to 
enhance and further develop Finnish ground combat doctrine. 
Military technology development has been chosen as the point of 
departure for the investigation. In addition to describing the 
most crucial technological areas it is also imperative to review 
those factors which become significant at that stage when different 
technologies become intertwined into an integrated weapons 
and command system. The study will undertake an evaluation of 
the central elements of future ground combat as well as presenting 
scenarios of possible operational models that might be employed 
by a potential aggressor. The interaction between combat doctrine 
and military technology as well as a review of the factors related 
to both will form the framework of this work. 
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2 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
COMBAT DOCTRINE AND MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGY 
2.1 The interactive relationship between combat doctrine and 
military technology and an examination of the time 
perspective 
A great power can develop its armaments in such a way that 
parallel research and development objectives can be attempted 
through numerous types of technologies and systems. This kind 
of model takes into consideration the risk that some technical 
systems will fail or of faulty scheduling. Though inevitably there 
are risks involved in the development work creating new premises 
and solutions, the model still generally enables the basic concept 
chosen to be developed. However, the level of development is 
always restricted to the limits of the assigned technology. The 
great power development model makes possible, and to some 
degree also imperative, the wide-scale introduction of up-to-
date technology. This kind of possibility and necessity a small 
country does not possess. 
However, a basic conceptual doctrine of ground combat can 
currently be ascertained without possessing a wide-ranging know-
how of high-tech development. The reason for this is that, 
compared to air and naval combat, ground combat contains a 
fundamental greater degree of unpredictability and accordingly 
places a greater emphasis on intuition. Will-power and fear also 
play more central roles in ground combat than in air and naval 
combat. These factors bring forth the level to which anexamination 
of ground combat doctrine is so influenced by human factors of 
strength and weakness that the key elements relating to victory 
in ground combat can already be found in the thoughts expressed 
by the Chinese writer Sun Tsu over 2000 years ago. 
The incomparability of human sensory and deductive 
capabilities in relation to those afforded by artificial intelligence, 
together with the difficulty involved in tracking them, makes it 
possible to simplify the interplay regarding combat doctrine and 
technology. Fixed peripheral conditions such as human 
operational models and analytical development work based on 
permanent conditional factors exert continuous interrelated 
feedback on these two concepts. The course of this interaction is 
chiefly determined by three factors. The first and most important 
factor is the development of technology and the degree of 
economic wherewithal that is invested in it. The second is the 
threat scenario ascertained through development work, and the 
third the different types of models laying out orders of importance. 
These factors are endeavored to be fitted to other systemic factors 
such as personnel, organizational structure and training systems. 
The combat doctrine concept that thereby emerges also determines 
the focus of technological development. 
The creation or amendment of a functional combat doctrine 
can last years, even decades. The most far-reaching time 
commitments are taken up by the introduction of new weapons 
systems and the training of their personnel which is a graduated 
process. Thus an examination set forth during any time frame 
can only be directed at one relative development situation to 
which its predecessor and successor phases must be linked to 
ascertain the logical development pattern. For this reason this 
work will not attempt to examine that development phase which 
is to be put into place during this decade since this would tend to 
dominate to a too large degree the entire examination. 
The choice of time perspective is also determined by the 
general progression of military technology. Though some rapidly 
developing technological areas of a weapons system may be 
proceeding with substantial leaps, they only form a part of the 
total system. The transformation of a weapons system from its 
operational requirements into a ready concept lasts about 10 
years. The period from concept until the system is ready for 
production takes more years. From a perspective of economic 
continuity a well adapted system of production should be spaced 
out over a number of years so that the weapons system is, to a 
significant extent, in operational use only a few years after the 
start-up of production. Even if training would be startedup during 
the concept phase, which is often possible, the length of time 
needed before the system is in operational use is generally at 
least 15-20 years from the time of defining the preliminary 
operational requirements. 
The setting of an exact time estimate is complicated by 
factors such as general economic problems as well as the rapid 
changes taking place in the international political arena. However, 
it can be speculated that the current situation in Russia and those 
states economically tied to it will prevent any significant 
technological innovations for at least ten years. This arrangement 
is also reflected in the situation regarding western armaments 
development where the changing nature of the threat scenario is 
leading to a correspondingly closer evaluation of cost analysis. 
That combined with the reduced volume of orders, the result of 
the fierce and wide-ranging armaments technology developments 
of the 80's, will have the effect of raising costs and slowing 
development during this decade. This will mean that technology 
developed in the laboratory will reach production level at a 
relatively slower rate than at present even though the production 
methods of industry are constantly being upgraded. 
By observing and analysing military technology today one 
can come up with a moderately reliable assessment of what type 
of forces, equipment and operational models will be needed in a 
period of ten years. The basis of the time perspective for this 
work will be in the area of 15 years. 
2.2 Factors influencing the combat doctrine of the great 
powers. 
The background to the combat doctrine and armaments 
development of the former Soviet army has been a powerful and 
all inclusive military-scientific approach. In western countries in 
general, and especially in the U.S.A., the corresponding work has 
rather been based on achieving its aims through an emphasis on 
technological development. During the final stages of the cold war 
the great military powers, despite having different points of 
departure, decided on employing similar frameworks in the 
development of their conventional forces. The former Soviet army's 
deep operative reconnaissance strike/fire complexes have the 
same basis as the U.S. AirLand Operations (formerly AirLand 
Battle Future). However, due to factors involving differences in 
the structure of American and Russian industry and especially the 
divergence in attitudes regarding the commercial development 
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and production of modern technology, the result is that in certain 
-itical conceptional areas of development in the former Soviet 
army could not keep pace to that in the West. 
Central components of the new technology such as micro-
electronics and data processing technology know-how have 
developed with great leaps in the west. The directing of substantial 
resources to these areas and the tight control of the know-how 
obtained has led to a situation in which the U.S. enjoys roughly a 
ten year advantage in the development of certain key technologies. 
On the other hand, in some areas such as the weapons application 
of electromagnetic radiation, the technology has been further 
developed in Russia than in the west. Likewise the former Soviet 
army's reconnaissance-strike/fire complexes use in battle may, 
owing to their firm scientific foundations at the conceptional 
level, be more functional than the corresponding AirLand 
Operations combat doctrine. The capability of the armed forces 
to bring these concepts into fruition, which is a central factor in 
any evaluation of their practicality, is not possible to evaluate in 
this work. 
The changes occurring in the sphere of international politics 
have had the effect of inducing surprisingly rapid changes to 
military threat scenarios. The changeover in development aims 
towards smaller and more mobile forces and thus less dense 
battlegrounds has come about during a space of a couple of 
years. Therefore the development work started up during the 
1980's and to which current doctrine is largely oriented to, has 
been overtaken by the course of events and, to a certain extent, 
become obsolete even before being introduced. Systems designed 
for massive deep strikes are not being employed to their optimum 
if the structure of the target or the operations model does not 
conform to the operational requirements to which the threat 
scenario was based upon. The changes in the threat scenario 
make it incumbent upon a great power that it employs a greater 
degree of flexibility in its doctrine and that it be more able to 
adjust to divergent areas and principles. The realization of 
flexibility in combat doctrine can only be brought about through 
reducing the maximum requirements of the system. 
In light of the aforementioned this examination can use as 
its basis the following points: 
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Military systems are rather precisely planned and therefore 
limited to the bounds of the threat scenario. Changes in the 
threat scenario cannot be quickly incorporated into system 
development. Substantial conditional or compositional 
deviation from the presumed threat scenario can fundamentally 
hamper the use of the system. 
The development of military technology will, in general, 
continue everywhere to proceed in the direction presented. 
Differences in resources and emphasis will bring about 
disparate solutions at the tactical and user level. From an 
operational standpoint, the systems to be examined will be 
found to be quite similar. 
Among the many parallel development areas of military 
technology only some approaches will be taken into 
operational use roughly within the time schedule mentioned. 
Consequently it will not be necessary to deal with all the 
development models. 
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3 DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY 
TECHNOLOGY 
3.1 The important development trends of military technology 
In recent years micro-electronics has clearly been the fastest 
developing technological area. Developments in micro-electronics 
have led to the scaling down of the size of components while also 
decidedly increasing the performance of different types of these 
units. This development has made possible a wider introduction 
of data processing technology applications than were previously 
attainable. Application development has likewise been offered 
as a tool for such areas where the insufficiency of processing 
capability or the insufficient graphicness of the phenomena to be 
investigated have limited development possibilities. The parallel 
occurrence of improvements in development and production 
methods have further accelerated this series of events to the 
extent that the development trend regarding the finished product 
has, in certain areas, been exponential. Areas where such progress 
has come about include the increased performance of integrated 
circuits as well as the reduction in the required space needed for 
magnetic mass memories. 
Based on micro-electronics and along with it undergoing 
rapid development is the area of optical applications. Integrated 
optics, among which are included optical memories as well as 
optical signal and data handling, accelerate the operation of data 
processing systems. Fibre optics offers an economical method for 
the transfer of a great capacity of information along an 
electronically protected infinitesimal route. With an optronic 
sensor it is possible to oversee one's field of operations as well as 
discern and identify targets without the use of sensory equipment 
and position revealing electromagnetic radiation. Though optronic 
systems are currently used mainly as fire control elements of 
weapon systems, they will also be put into limited use as a 
blinding laser-weapon during this decade. 
The enhanced handling speed and data recording capacity 
of modern micro-electronics during the 1980's has brought about 
in the area of automatic data handling applications as great a 
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rearrangement of tasks as that imposed by the development of 
mechanized industrial automation during the whole of the 
preceding century. This speed has even led in certain areas to 
situations where the full possibilities of new data processing 
technology have not been able to be realized before a new 
generation of technology is already brought to the fore. In light 
of these facts it can clearly be seen that any military system based 
on data processing technology will have already become 
outmoded by the time it is scheduled to be put into service. 
Another problem related to data processing technology is 
the limited know-how related to systems development. This 
means that, on the one hand, the total potential benefit of the 
data system is only partially realized and, on the other hand, that 
it becomes difficult to get the individual components of the total 
system to perform together. In the application of military data 
systems it must be ascertained in each individual case whether it 
is possible for the chosen procedure to be used manually or is the 
system totally dependent on its own technical and functional 
reliability. In military applications the preceding approach is 
typical of command and decision making systems as well as 
mechanisms used for intelligence analysis. Purely technical 
systems can be used to support both intelligence and surveillance 
systems as well as handling the raw data of the sensory component 
of weapons. 
Other rapidly developing military technology areas are 
electromagnetic radiation countermeasures and weapon 
applications, hyper-velocity missiles and cluster weapons, homing 
and guided projectiles as well as the application of material 
technology to elements of different weapon systems along with 
their application to passive and active protection. Though 
development also extends to narrow special areas such as 
vehicular suspension systems, developments in these areas will 
not bring any decisive extra value to the performance of the total 
system. For this reason the examination will be limited to the 
previously presented technological areas. 
3.2 Micro-electronics 
Manufacturing technology has led to the development of very 
high speed and large-scale integrated circuits (VHSIC and VLSIC). 
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During the 1990's there will be achieved a nearly two decade 
advance in the effectiveness of processors. This means for example 
that the target acquisition capability of surveillance systems will 
be increased many-fold provided the performance of the sensor 
enables a corresponding increase in the receiving capacity of the 
signals. 
The diversified components to be employed in micro and 
millimetre wave bands will be composed of Gallium Arsenide 
and other compound-based semiconductor substrates. Integrated 
circuits based on these compounds will be introduced during the 
coming years (MIMIC = Millimetric Wave Monolithic Integrated 
Circuit; MMIC = Micrometric Wave MIC). The advantages of 
these new technologies over traditional solutions are their 
increased performance and high frequency bands as well as their 
substantially lower manufacturing costs together with their higher 
tolerance to changing types of conditions and attempts at 
jamming. 
The MIMIC and MMIC systems will enable the formation of 
phased array radar antennas so that each antenna element in 
both the transmitter and receiver will be capable of functioning 
independently of the other elements. This type of active antenna 
increases both the system's ability to control multiple-target 
situations as well as its combat endurance. Some wider 
applications of the MIMIC are in navigation & acquisition, IFF 
and communication. A third significant area of application is in 
the sensor component of warheads. The reduction of the size of 
the sensor coupled with the increase of its performance will lead 
to the development of the first warheads capable of target 
identification. Use of MIMIC will also expand the tracking 
capabilities of radar homing missiles. In the optical area the same 
kind of trend of development is being sought through the use of 
charge coupled devices. As a recorder of analogical data they 
will be especially applied to the handling of pictorial information. 
Besides having the advantage of small size, these components 
also consume little power which combine to make possible 
sensory applications involving the identification of figures and 
forms. 
Developments in the preceding areas are also influenced by 
the advances leading towards the introduction of super 
conductive components. The reduction of electric resistance to 
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levels approaching zero will mean, among other things, the 
possibility of maintaining a substantial quantity of electric current 
in modest-sized power devices. Similar developments are being 
effected to temperature levels that can be obtainable also outside 
the laboratory. Project applications based on the use of super 
conductive components include accelerated activity of advanced 
optronic sensors as well as the attaining of the required signal 
handling speed necessary for the identification of complex figures. 
The effect of micro-electronic development can, at the systems 
level, be compressed into the following: that which today can be 
implemented only through the use of a fixed system will in ten 
years be capable of being fitted onto a vehicle. Correspondingly, 
the system will have shrunk to a size that will enable it to become 
portable. Thus strategic level system capacity will, by the 
beginning of the next decade, have been put at least into 
operational and partially even into tactical use. However, wide-
scale total systems will not generally be able to be set up at the 
battalion level since the necessary short-delay data transfer 
facilities required for obtaining the full performance value of the 
system would make it prohibitively expensive. Projectile 
applications during the first part of the next decade will be 
placed on putting target identification sensors into operational 
use. This will not be carried out on a large-scale but rather 
limited to, at most, a few already expensive weapons systems. 
3.3 Data processing technology 
Developments in micro-electronics have made possible a 
significant uplifting in the performance, programmed decision 
supporting capabilities and degrees of automation of military 
systems. One consequence of this development is that program 
methods improve at a pace which makes precise future 
predications difficult. The reduction in the price of components 
will also facilitate the utilization of micro-electronics for military 
equipment used on a mass level. Because of these cost 
developments new areas of application will be continuously 
investigated. The quickest development at these mass or tactical 
levels will take place in areas in which the technology can also be 
fitted to civilian applications. These include, for example, 
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personnel and material administrative systems, cartographic-
based applications, research and simulation models as well as 
data transfer and data network systems. When forthcoming civil 
applications begin to become parts of military systems there will 
be increased problems related to standardization and 
compatibility of the data processing technology. 
The size of the computer code and the complexity of different 
kinds of data processing systems together with the increased 
amount of data to be handled in the unit of time, have led to the 
development of expert systems employing artificial intelligence 
that are used as an aid to the operator. With the help of such 
systems one can systematically collect and use empirical data 
together with other knowledge. The problems related to 
developing applications for artificial intelligence will precipitate 
the shaping of a large body of handling regulations and data files 
which will be used to arrive at conclusions reached at the expert 
level. This need for arriving at conclusions is apparent owing to 
the increased amount of information being garnered from 
different types of sensors and other intelligence systems. 
Another new development area of data processing 
technology are neural networks. These circuits utilize parallel 
processing to trace the constituent parts of the human brain, 
neurons. Thus the circuits formed can be expected to have 
applications enabling them to carry out learning operations. 
Neural networks could be employed in those aspects of 
intelligence collecting related to object identification and the 
automatic gathering of data. Information gained in this way for 
the weapon to be deployed would mean that the weapon's total 
performance capabilities would remain at least at the same level 
during the duration of the combat situation despite any 
empirically developed — chiefly passive — countermeasures. 
With the aid of target data processed algorithms the different 
elements of the weapon's system can be tailor-made to operate 
according to the requirements of the individual buyer which 
may deviate radically from the specifications laid forth by another 
customer. Algorithms can be used to direct the operations of a 
still greater amount of precision guided weapons whose role as 
the critical factor in different military systems will be decisively 
heightened. Processed algorithms will also continue to remain a 
closely guarded secret between the customer and the producer. 
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Producers and defence departments will not, however, endeavor 
to conceal the hardware used or its performance capabilities 
since these are, owing to their commercial applications, generally 
already well known. However, the development of algorithms 
will still take years even after the hardware is ready. The 
phenomenon is therefore quite similar to the general development 
of data processing technology, only the time-lag is greater. 
The role of operational war games and model simulation 
incorporating the interaction between the influence of weapons 
and tactics, will be significantly increased in areas related to the 
analysis of intelligence data as well as preparation for war. Simple 
models will also become commercially available. Models drawn 
up on the basis of each user's troop and weapon system plans as 
well as their deployment will increase decisively in the coming 
years. With regard to training systems, simulators will become 
one of the central elements in the development of military 
preparedness. 
The development work involving artificial intelligence has 
proved to be quite problematical and only preliminary versions 
of the depicted applications will be able to be put into use during 
this decade. As far as weapon applications are concerned, artificial 
intelligence and neural networks will remain at the development 
stage. It is possible that these two concepts could be employed as 
part of an electronic warfare system as well as a support system 
for intelligence and decision-making operations. However, the 
most important strategic development area will be in formulating 
software for command, control, communications and intelligence 
( C3I) systems. The effects on these areas during the period of the 
next ten years is almost impossible to evaluate. 
3.4 Data transfer 
There will be developed at the strategic level a command and 
communications system that will be national, and even 
supranational, in scope. The primary goal will be the 
establishment of an integrated services digital network. In 
addition to traditional data transfer such a system will include, 
among other things, data recording and retrieval services. At the 
tactical level there will be developed a corresponding mobile 
network. Digitalization will create the preconditions for the 
integration of different services, so that in the same network it 
will be possible to transfer data, texts and graphical material in 
addition to voice transmission. 
Special attention will be directed towards maintaining data 
protection and anti-jamming capabilities of the command 
network. Wide-scale digitalization offers multifaceted possibilities 
for automatic and necessary data protection. Large capacity optical 
transmission paths will offer parallel solutions in all those systems 
in which connection formation time will not constitute a critical 
factor for optical cables. By the end of the decade difficult to jam 
laser beams will be in use as linking systems at operational levels 
of command. 
The scattering of electromagnetic waves that takes place in 
the troposphere forms the basis of tactical linking connections 
which makes possible a 100-300 kilometer contact distance. At 
the corps level and above such kinds of links can support strategic 
and far reaching ground intelligence as well as the operational 
elements of simultaneous data transfer required for the control 
of deep battles. At the strategic level these have already been 
complemented by communication satellites. The general 
development trends of micro-electronics and data systems point 
to their coming into service also as support systems at both the 
operational and tactical levels. 
At the tactical level of command, especially involving 
battalions and their lower chain of command, radio will continue 
to form the first communication instrument also during the 
beginning years of the next millennium. Development projects 
involving VHF and UHF radios will, during the ongoing decade, 
lead to the introduction of digital voice transmission and spread 
spectrum radio systems. Developments in portable field links 
will follow the development pattern of VHF and UHF radios. 
Owing to the increasing degree of complexity of the 
technology involved and the related importance of testing and 
repairing faults in the equipment to be used, there will be a need 
for the development of different types of testing equipment and 
systems. In the future there will be built into both command and 
weapons systems internal testing systems. These systems 
decisively speed up testing and servicing tasks. However, a 
precondition for their efficient deployment is the commitment of 
large resources for spare parts as well as the placement of well- 
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trained staff for a servicing system that will already be required 
at the operational level. 
3.5 Optronic systems 
The most important development trends in the field of optronics 
are spread spectrum optical components, linear detectors 
fabricated from charge coupled device (CCD) components and 
CCD-detector matrices as well as shape recognition systems. The 
performance of these systems is tied to the degree of signal 
handling speed that is attainable. In the near future an anti-
armour missile CCD-detector matrix will be brought into 
production. A clearly greater processing capability is required 
for shape recognition which is why its inclusion in the system to 
be sought is possible only during the next decade at the earliest. 
Besides its traditional applications optronics is also 
overtaking other systems, for example the tasks of radar. This 
can partly be explained by the fact that while the performance of 
integrated circuits skyrockets, their cost rises only marginally. 
With respect to radar-based sensors, the coming into general use 
of optronic systems can be explained by their greater 
discrimination capability which enables target recognition from 
afar. Discrimination also dictates the accuracy of the system. 
Another essential quality that will be stressed in the future is 
shape recognition capability, the consequence of which could be 
the development of so-called "brilliant" munitions. A third 
advantage will be reached through the simultaneous or phased 
use of many different types of frequency bands so as to reduce 
the amount of false alarms as well as making it possible to choose 
the optimal sensor for each set of conditions. 
For the time being — meaning during this millennium — 
optronics will be developed mostly as parts of multi-sensor 
systems. Typical development areas are to be found in the target 
acquisition components of air defence and air-to-air missile 
systems, the duel sensors of smart munitions, real-time 
intelligence systems as well as shape recognition equipment. 
Simple types of optronic equipment that will be taken into general 
use by tactical forces include control and surveillance equipment 
as well as weapon sights. The high cost and, at present, substantial 
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weight of thermal imagers prevents their introduction as 
equipment for individual combatants. 
In expensive and heavy weapons systems thermal imagers 
will clearly be taken into more general use. As a consequent of 
this trend product development will mean that both the price 
and the size of the units will decrease in the future. As a 
component of weapon systems, thermal imaging technology will 
overtake the solution afforded by image intensifiers by the start 
of the next decade at the latest. However, the small size of the 
latest image intensifiers makes possible their being fitted onto 
the helmets of individuals so that the weapon system's key 
personnel are able to operate at close-combat distances also in 
the dark. The significance of thermal imager technology in 
independent target acquisition systems increased only at that 
point when it became capable of affording a panoramic solution 
to the area under surveillance. Rapid signal handling enables the 
comprehension of the target situation from a wide ranging area 
straight to the user's presentation system. The problem with this 
solution is the great amount of false alarms that occur. As a 
consequence of this the final system development will be focused 
upon the next decade. 
The systematic development of lasers has, at the strategic 
level, been carried out mainly in secret. The primary goal of the 
work carried out has been the development of a beam weapon 
that could be deployed as a mass destruction laser. At the tactical 
level laser distance meters have been integrated into different 
types of fire control systems. Lasers are also used in the process 
of guidance beam formation. However, only CO2-gas lasers, which 
are currently under development, will enable the use of this type 
of weapon system in inclement weather. With regard to missiles 
and bombs which are homing to laser designation, the CO2 laser 
would afford fundamental benefits. However, in comparing this 
system to one employing radar, the dependency on conditions 
must still be taken into account. As a consequence of this, the use 
of laser beams in weapon control systems will be limited to 
supplementary applications. In short-range homing systems the 
difficult to jam millimetre wave band is being sought as a 
replacement for lasers. 
The laser-radar supplementary system is to be developed 
because, compared to microwave bands, it affords a better angular 
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and doppler resolution as well as, in theory, the ability to examine 
smaller-sized objects. The realization of the lastmentioned 
supposition is an essential precondition for continued 
development of laser-radar. The attainment of the required level 
of performance will require a period of time that will extend to 
cover at least this decade. As a component of surveillance and 
weapon systems laser gyroscopes afford the possibilityVof tens of 
kilometres of extremely accurate navigation without the need for 
updating. 
The passive nature of optronic systems presupposes the 
development of active counterweapon systems. For this role there 
will be developed conventional quick-fire automatic action 
weapons in addition to systems based on powerful 
electromagnetic radiation. Powerfully directed laser radiation 
produces, already in small intensities, a destructive impact to 
optronic sensors. During this decade such type of laser weapons 
will be put into service on important weapons systems, for 
example as close protective equipment for battle tanks. A second 
area where it will quickly be put into use is as a blinding laser 
weapon which can be used in both anti-aircraft and anti-armour 
systems. 
At lower frequency bands electromagnetic radiation 
dissipates to a wide area away from where it has been transmitted 
so that a precondition for the achievement of the required power 
density is the employment of bulky electrical power equipment. 
Though such systems are the natural consequence of 
developments related to jamming systems, they will not, owing 
to their size and weight, come into operational-tactical use before 
the next decade at the earliest. 
3.6 Radar systems 
The development of radar systems is invariably linked to the 
demands set forth by different operational needs. Though radar 
systems are still called upon to possess a great range, other 
requirements are increasingly influencing their development 
trend. The new demands put upon radar are directed especially 
towards increased jamming resistance, reducing the effects of 
false targets, the capability to separate small targets also against 
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the surface of the ground as well as the elimination of dead 
zones. One factor that is steering development work is the 
presence of radar homing weapons. In order to reduce their 
influence both surveillance and fire control radar are striving to 
control the level of radiation they emit, so called quiet radar. 
The performance of radar systems are decisively influenced 
by the choice of the optimal transmission band and the processing 
of the received signal. Radar signals, which in the beginning 
were mainly limited to the processing of video signals, have 
expanded their operations to include the optimization of the 
signal in both transmitters and receivers. The reduction of its 
physical size and power consumption have especially improved 
the performance of those radar systems employed in weapons 
and airplanes. For example, the discrimination of synthetic 
aperture radar is significantly enhanced by a shortening of the 
processing time which in turn enables the use of radar for deep 
target acquisition. 
The development of phased antennas, and especially that of 
active antenna elements, have enabled the combining of the 
different functions of radar into parallel processes. Such processes 
could serve to perform the operations of surveillance, multiple-
target acquisition, passive observation of jamming sources, 
registration of environmental conditions as well as functioning 
as a command link to the weapon system's warhead. This kind 
of radar is difficult to saturate and jam so that, for example, an 
artillery radar could simultaneously follow the flight of several 
projectiles without interrupting its surveillance of the horizontal. 
Target follow-up and electronic countermeasure capabilities are 
increased through the deployment to the target of fast adaptive 
pulse waves. This would enable, for example, the radar that was 
following the path of an attack fighter plane to lock itself 
automatically onto a missile being deployed from the plane, if 
this process has been programmed into the radar. Such a solution 
also influences the development of stealth technology since 
traditional methods designed towards reducing radar cross-
section would thereby lose their effectiveness. 
The areas of application for radar will expand from long-
range to short-range. In addition to introducing short-range 
ground surveillance radar, different types of terrain obstacle 
warning equipment will quickly come into use which will enable, 
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among other things, helicopters to operate at low altitudes in the 
dark. During the next decade these types of warning systems 
will compose only part of these costly overall terrain surveillance 
and/or fire control radar systems. 
However, radar will come into even wider general use as 
weapon warhead sensors whereupon the key technology to be 
employed will be that derived from millimetric wave monolith 
integrated circuits (MIMIC). The attempt to achieve direct-fire 
from an indirectly-fired weapon presupposes that the projectile 
will have the capability to independently find the target. However, 
in many phases of operations involving the use of projectiles 
with independent targeting capabilities, the limiting factors 
caused by the interaction of different components with one 
another must be taken into account. As a consequence of this, an 
order of priorities involving the different properties of the weapon 
has had to be laid out. Because of the desire to maximize the 
effect of the explosive charge, compromises have been directed 
mainly towards the overwhelmingly most expensive component 
of the system, the sensor. 
By the middle of the next decade only a limited amount of 
smart munitions will have been put into service. The infrared 
sensors or millimetre wave band radars of these projectiles will 
be able to discern a potential target only from a distance of a few 
hundred metres. The job of target recognition will rest upon 
comparison through parallel technology. A limitation of this 
system is the narrow range of the area to be scrutinized. The 
problem involved with trying to widen the area to be searched, is 
that it then becomes quite difficult to separate the target from 
those objects which bear some resemblance to it. The demands 
placed on signal processing will, in the near future, come to 
exceed the capabilities for such processing, which together with 
cost factors may lead to the postponement of these projects. 
3.7 The combining of sensors and navigation technology 
In command-and-control systems data compiled from many 
sources is further processed in order to attain an exact and 
understandable picture of the overall situation. Modern data 
combining systems are constructed so as to flexibly link up all 
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types of data which are received. The data obtained from one 
sensor immediately affects the operation of another and the final 
scene of the situation is a composite of both. This type of structure 
can be compared to the interaction of the human sensory system. 
Development work is currently being aimed towards, among 
other areas, battlefield command-and-control systems, where 
work is being undertaken to integrate radar, optronic and acoustic 
sensors. 
Through the use of measured and processed data one can 
predict the target or target grouping's operating principles, actions 
and vulnerability. When the picture of the situation is fully 
formed, precise overall data enables an optimal assignment of 
different weapon systems towards the target. In this type of total 
system there are several advantages in employing multi-sensor 
technology. The operating area is continuously controlled by a 
joining together of different sensors working out of various 
observation sectors and operating times. The effectiveness of the 
system is enhanced through the employment of automatic target-
locking and target tracking capabilities. This capability is also 
maintained during those occasions when the target information 
obtained from one sensor is insufficient. Target perception 
capability can be maximized by utilizing the special properties of 
the sensors. The overlapping activities of the sensors enable target 
analysis from many different angles and from different wave 
length areas. The operating capability of a multi-sensor system is 
also maintained when it is exposed to attempts at jamming. This 
is the result of both the passive sensors which are contained 
within the system as well as its capability to analyse received 
signals. Target recognition is achieved by first grading the follow-
up data and then comparing it to that which is contained in the 
data files of other tactical systems. This totality is then used to 
draw-up the threat analysis. 
The next development areas for precision guided weapons 
will be in the area of multi-sensors and multi-processors. Multi-
sensors could, in the future, be realized through the use of sensors 
that support the functions of one another in the carrying out of 
their respective tasks. In such a case the area that remains to be 
developed is multi-processing. However, the continual increase 
in the speed of processing will facilitate development in this area 
as well. The multi-sensor system is, owing to its overall reliability, 
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considered the most cost effective solution though it is projectile-
wise more expensive. 
From the point of view of total effective operation of a 
weapon or command system, it is decisively important to know 
the placement of each key system. A knowledge of location will 
facilitate the coming into general use of inertial as well as satellite-
based automatic navigational systems. The modest cost 6f satellite 
location equipment enables it to be taken into use at the company, 
and even platoon levels. It is then possible to transfer the 
information obtained from this system to a multi-service network 
or other integrated command network straight to the needed 
data base. This principle enables the commander to quickly direct 
the flow of troops and firepower, even in rapidly changing 
situations, according to the tactics chosen. 
Though satellite-based position location affords in coverage 
and accuracy all necessary position, time and speed data, it does 
not eliminate the need for an independent and undisturbable 
system. For this reason ground vehicles will mainly be fitted 
with strap-down inertial navigational systems during this decade. 
In addition, laser gyroscopes will come into general use as angular 
measurement systems for the reason that the elimination of 
mechanical movements and parts will markedly add to the 
accuracy, dependability and longevity of the system. The same 
navigational technology will also become prevalent in weapon 
systems, especially long-range missiles. The intention is to include 
several parallel systems so that the passivity which is a 
precondition for undisturbed operation can be maintained in all 
situations. 
3.8 Electronic warfare systems 
The reaching out to higher frequency bands that occurs in 
electronic reconnaissance systems, always corresponds to where 
the target system's frequency band has been developed to. In 
addition to this the systems operate in ever wider frequency 
ranges. The development of reception technology together with 
data systems, processing and automation enables the integration 
of different systems. This means that a weakness in one type of 
receiver can be complemented through a favourable property 
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displayed by another. Efficient integrated systems are capable of 
analysing the signals being emitted from a dense signal 
environment. Electronic intelligence systems possess the ability 
to discern both their basic properties as well as their technical 
solutions. With the drawing together of these areas the systems 
of electronic listening and measurement reconnaissance could be 
united. However, this presupposes the use of expert systems. 
The processing of the data emitted from concealed transmitters 
would, at present, require the level of performance of a 
supercomputer which would limit the cracking of data security 
codes at the strategic level. The pace of modern combat is 
constantly increasing while development of countermeasure 
techniques, especially involving electronic warfare, moves at a 
slightly slower speed than system development. This means that 
analysis at the tactical level will remain random also in the 
future. 
The integrating together of optical systems to radar and 
radio frequencies also increases the need for electronic intelligence 
in this area. Infrared and laser radiation scanners will become 
essential parts of both large conventional as well as electronic 
reconnaissance systems. Radar warning systems will employ 
new integrated circuits which will make them smaller and quicker. 
The warning systems are drawing nearer to tactical reconnaissance 
systems in that through them one can maintain a clear picture of 
the electronic operating environment. The integration of these 
systems will form part of the process of linking up electronic 
intelligence to jamming and reconnaissance systems. 
Signal routing has been increased in radio networks through 
spread spectrum techniques especially frequency jumping, data 
encrypting and temporal shortening of the transmitter as well as 
digitalization. These solutions set forth significant demands upon 
the performance of a jamming system. Against sophisticated 
combat radios there will be initiated quick scanning receivers as 
well as increased data processing capacity to enable faster tracking 
and follow-up as well as the direction of the jamming to new 
frequencies. This last property uses the time division principle as 
its basis. 
The jamming of VHF and UHF radio networks plays an 
essential part in current tactical warfare. The previously presented 
radio technology development lines will lead to a widening of 
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the range of disturbance systems to include areas such as 
automatic-starting process directed transmitting systems and 
disposable jamming transmitters. The latter would be deployed 
in an effort to paralyse the operations of staff or key weapon 
systems during combat situations. With the aid of developed 
algorithms these systems could afford optimal frequency control 
and time attributes whereby their jamming effect could be 
effectively joined to the planned operation. 
Radar jamming systems will become more automatic. They 
work off a preset threat and operations model scenario which is 
activated after the parameters of the threat signals emitted from 
the signal environment are measured. The jamming system is 
joined with a data bus to the intelligence system which operates 
with it on the same frequency. Parallel jamming of several 
different systems can be obtained through utilization of the time 
division principle. The amount of electronic decoy equipment 
will significantly increase owing to favourable cost developments. 
The problems related to electrical jamming of optical systems 
are firstly, that the target must first be discerned and secondly, 
that optical signals are difficult to interpret. For these reasons 
optical jamming has a different basis than that used against radio 
or radar frequencies. The development work has instead been 
directed towards infrared and laser scanners, new flare material 
and construction as well as the gathering of other sensors into a 
countermeasure system. In addition to these there will be brought 
into service during this decade infrared protective smoke as well 
as infrared sensor influenced laser systems. 
Only a great power possesses the wherewithal to develop 
electronic warfare technology on a large-scale. Smaller states are 
obligated, owing to cost factors, to seek compromise solutions in 
which the core requirements are directed towards carefully chosen 
key areas. This arrangement is not so problematic in strategic 
intelligence where developments in data technology produce 
efficient systems at moderate cost. However, the situation is 
different with regard to electronic jamming if one's goal is to 
maintain and further develop versatile communications and 
intelligence systems. 
The building up of jamming systems to an operational level 
is a long-lasting process. It lasts many years for the target systems 
to develop jamming resistance. For this reason the target systems 
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are generally a step ahead of purely electromagnetically-based 
jamming systems. By combining electronic intelligence with 
lethality — as has been done with radar homing missiles - the 
arrangement is altered. Though electronic jamming can obtain in 
the short run a decided effect, it is however only a supplementary 
system and the more effective means of paralysing a C3I-system 
will also in the future remain lethality. 
3.9 Weapon effectiveness 
The general development lines of weapon effectiveness technology 
Warhead development in weapon systems is increasingly tied to 
overall weapon system development. Development examination 
begins by analysing the properties of the target and ends by 
calculating what kind of costs are entailed from developing the 
weapon system's different components to their desired degree of 
lethality. Then it will be decided whether to implement an even 
more comprehensive weapons system or to modernize the 
existing system. In a comprehensive weapons system concept, 
the economic significance of the warhead is extremely small, so 
that within the limits imposed by structural and size factors, it is 
generally possible to optimize the warhead. However, 
comprehensive concepts are so expensive, that the greater part of 
development work is directed towards the graduated 
development of existing systems. 
When approaching the question from the target point of 
view the examination produces three parallel lines of 
development. The first line seeks to compress the warhead's 
combat charge to the smallest possible dimensions of size and 
mass while still enabling it to achieve its desired effect. This 
requires the selection of the most vulnerable part of the target for 
the point of effect. In anti-armour weaponry the attempt would 
be to effect the target from above or below. The most effective 
targeting direction for an aerial target would be from above. The 
second line of examination involves effecting a degree of hit 
probability for the warhead correspondent to its range. Hit 
probability can be improved only by either better utilizing the 
information received from the target, by shortening the time-lag 
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or by significantly extending the warhead's area of effectiveness. 
Hit probability is strongly tied to the choice of the target's 
most vulnerable area. An example of this type of development 
line are independent homing projectiles or target seeking 
explosively formed short-delay fired projectiles. Cluster weapon 
use is also based on this same point of departure. In working 
with these systems it is accepted that the level of hit probability 
involving the hitting of specific elements of the target can not be 
raised to a high level. However, since targets employed for ground 
combat operations contain, with a few exceptions, many tens of 
elements, a well dimensioned technological response employing 
cluster weapons could be a very cost effective total solution. 
Development in weapon effectiveness technology is 
significantly slower than in similar micro-electronic sectors. 
However, research and development techniques are exerted from 
the same point of departure. Significant steps forward have been 
achieved only through the assistance of developed data systems. 
The key area has been the development of simulation and model 
construction into computer assisted development processes which 
have helped, for example, in converting experimental flow 
dynamics into a complicated design model and then into a graphic 
form. 
This development will lead, during this decade, to the putting 
into service of optimized conventional warheads which can be 
deployed against the chosen targets. Typical types of systems to 
be deployed will be hyper-velocity munitions and missiles, multi-
effecting programmed cluster weapons as well as explosively 
formed projectiles. 
Warheads 
By the end of the decade hypersonic speeds will also become 
capable of being arrived at on the ground. The great density of 
air will present exceptional demands regarding the maintenance 
of aerodynamic control of projectiles. For example the achievment 
of a speed five times the speed of sound would mean that a mass 
in abundance of 10 kilograms would possess the capability to 
completely destroy a main battle tank. Hyper-velocity long-range 
anti-tank missiles will become a dominant element in open area 
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tank combat. In other weapons systems the increase in speed will 
decrease the reaction time of the system and thus heighten its 
impregnability. The problems involved in directing the missile 
during its fierce acceleration phase limit the use of such hyper-
velocity weapons in close-combat. 
Cluster weapons began to be introduced into general use 
already during the 1980's. Though clustering the munitions used 
in artillery and air weaponry has decisively increased their 
effectiveness compared to that achieved through conventional 
high explosives, they are in some respects looked upon as a 
transitional solution. Cluster weapons are at their optimum 
effectiveness in those type of situations in which the target is 
located in an open area without effective protection, such as 
heavily armoured or well-prepared fortifications. In covered or 
soft terrain the range of fragmentation effect of the clusters 
becomes almost nonexistent. A jet of small calibre hollow charges 
are quickly checked by effective cover. 
The reduction in the strength of combat forces coupled with 
the increased mobility requirements of firepower will mean that 
individual target elements become valuable objects of interest. 
These type of targets can only be sporadically affected by 
conventional explosives. Cluster weapons are most effective when 
they are released deep into enemy deployments. At long distances 
the weakening of hit probability is a factor that also must be 
taken into consideration. In approaching the actual combat area 
the great scattering of cluster weapons as well as the high risk of 
duds together with the density of explosives fundamentally 
weaken their performance. Both problems are capable of being 
solved through the development of a homing system situated 
either into the cargo missile or the clusters they are carrying. This 
development model has been able to be realized only as a result 
of the extraordinary increase in the performance of micro-
electronics. During this decade there will be brought into service 
cluster weapons chiefly meant for anti-armour purposes but also 
to be used in anti-helicopter operations. In these weapons the 
warhead will have the capability to either home in on the target 
or discern the target and then direct an explosively formed 
projectile to it. These type of clusters will be discharged from 
artillery weapons as well as from the air. 
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Other development areas exerting influence on warheads 
From the point of view of weapon effectiveness, explosive 
development will bring only marginal benefit in the near future. 
Traditional development areas, such as detonation speed, are 
being overtaken by demands involving reliability, safety and 
performance. One example of this is the greater tolerance to 
launch acceleration and the concomitant increase in range of 
plastic bonded explosives. 
Conventional propellant appears to be near the end point of 
its possible development. Though the effectiveness and burning 
properties of propellant will be heightened through the 
employment of additives, other solutions will be sought to bring 
about the desired benefits. These include approaches involving 
the use of disposable burning casement material and unicharge 
systems. Burning casements are suitable for machine and heavy 
weapons. However, their suitability for use in hand weapon 
systems is questionable. One line of development regarding hand 
weapons is centered entirely around the use of caseless cartridges. 
This development may however be halted owing to the fact that 
hand weapon systems will not be forming a focal point in the 
losses incurred on a modern battlefield. 
Burning casements can increase the rate of fire of machine 
fired weapons and facilitate the distribution of munitions and 
the operations of an evacuation system. Similar benefits are sought 
through the deployment of a unicharge system. Especially with 
regard to heavy gun systems, the use of many different propelling 
charges leads to a situation where it becomes difficult for them 
all to attain their optimum use. The result of this type of system 
is the creation of substantial waste in evacuation and data 
handling as well as a permanent damage risk which is minimized 
through the deployment of unit charge systems. 
Solid propellants can not essentially improve the specific 
impulse of a charge of propellant. For this reason the feasibility 
of using liquid propellants in gun systems is being investigated. 
Smaller quantities of liquid propellants will be capable of 
achieving the same maximum pressure of solid propellants. As a 
consequence of the increase of the total impulse the launch speed 
and thereby the range of gun system projectiles will be 
significantly enhanced. The increased muzzle-velocity achieved 
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due to direct firing also means increased impact energy. The 
advantages offered by liquid propellants are so great and their 
development have progressed so far, that systems based on them 
will be brought into service at the beginning of the next decade, 
primarily in artillery systems. At the same time liquid propellants 
will offer an interim solution for the next generation of launch-
impulse mechanisms which are under development. Though a 
theoretical ability to exploit electromagnetic propulsion will also 
be achieved during this decade, it will not become operational 
for at least another 20 years. 
The development trends of missile propellant mechanisms 
do not follow the course of gun systems development. Solid 
propellants will continue to maintain their leading role, however 
composite propellants will displace traditional double-based solid 
fuels. The share of metal additives as an inducer of high specific 
impulses can be reduced with other additives so that smoke 
formation can be minimized. The problem connected with using 
solid propellant motors are their limited range. A one-stage motor 
can not now exceed a firing distance of 40-50 kilometres. For this 
reason there will be sought supersonic missiles to increase the 
range possibilities from two directions. 
One approach is the use of a two-stage solid fuel rocket 
motor which can nearly double the range and achieve flexible 
applications involving different speed and height adaptations. It 
would thus be suitable for long-range air targets and air-to-
ground missiles. However, at present there are problems 
concerning the reliability of these two-stage rocket fuel motors 
so that their introduction into operational use has been put off 
until the next decade. The other solution that will become more 
quickly operational is offered by the solid fuel ramjet engine. 
Intended mainly for applications involving air-to-ground missiles 
but also as a solutions for air-to-air missiles, its problem has been 
its limited lateral acceleration capabilities. 
Cover 
The demands brought about by the increase in combat mobility, 
the use of more effective intelligence, the speeding up of the 
introduction of fire as well as the increased accuracy and intensity 
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of firepower, presents great challenges to the field of cover. 
Cover and protection is provided through the thwarting of the 
activities of an enemy. Discernability, identification and the choice 
of target points is encumbered by mobility, dispersal, 
concealment, the deployment of decoys, structural solutions, the 
use of armour and fortifications as well as personal protective 
equipment. The most significant technological solutions are those 
involved with armouring and added personal protection. 
The armouring of main battle tanks is being endeavoured to 
incorporate into an integrated and modularized system. In an 
integrated system the greatest possible mass can also be utilized 
as an element for protection. In a modular system the main 
armour would be formed from elements which can be either 
changed or replaced. As a consequence of the latter approach the 
material and method development can exploit the short time-lag 
as a factor offering added protection. 
The protection of main battle tanks and armoured fighting 
vehicles as well as, later on, self-propelled artillery will be 
improved through the deployment of add-on armour. For this 
purpose there can be used layered constructs, composite and 
reactive elements as well as harder qualities of steel. However, 
owing to its high density, steel is being displaced by aluminium 
and ceramic materials. Substantial added protection against 
traditional shaped charges is achieved through the fitting of 
reactive armour. However, double shaped charges as well as 
explosively formed projectiles work effectively also against 
armour protected with reactive elements. This development 
course will lead to an increase in the share of ceramic materials 
used and later on the development of multi-constructed armour. 
One development trend is leading towards active armour, which 
would function on the basis of the threat manifestation before 
the projectile actually impacts against the armour. For lightly 
armoured vehicles there will be sought a reactive protection in 
which the explosive effect would be so subdued that it would 
not have any damaging effect on the vehicle itself. 
The protection of individual combatants against fragments 
and the residual effects of armour penetration will be fulfilled 
through the introduction of improved flak jackets and more 
advanced helmets. The flak jacket material will consist of Kevlar 
together with nylon which is, despite its greater weight, clearly 
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cheaper. The material of helmets will consist of reinforced 
composite plastic and the fabric layers which are joined to it. The 
protective equipment for combatants will not be able to offer 
sufficient protection against the simultaneously developing 
explosive materials, but it will decisively reduce personnel losses 
in marginal situations. 
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4 FROM TECHNOLOGY INTO 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
4.1 The effects of the development of military technology 
The objectives ofmilitary systems will remain the traditional ones; 
the increasing of the range and effectiveness of individual units 
are still the central goals. In those systems which are reaching the 
limits, of the existing technology the goal must be to aspire to a new 
solution. A ten year development period is not quite enough time 
to produce fundamental changes. The performance of weapons 
systems can be upgraded by making possible the destruction of 
valuable individual targets with a few projectiles. Individual 
target-seeking or homing projectiles will play a significant role in 
land forces' weapons development. There are constantly being 
found new countermeasure methods to be employed against the 
newestweapons systems as well as the most developed intelligence 
equipment, so that the familiar development race continues on. 
However, its focal point is shifting away from a matter against 
matter arrangement to one involving applications of 
electromagnetic radiation. 
Development in the leading sectors will be substantial. The 
introduction of the latest sensors into intelligence systems will 
diversify the gathering of information. The parallel operations of 
many sensors together with electronic intelligence systems will 
facilitate the production of usable information also when any 
single piece of equipment alone would not possess the capability 
to perform the given task. Parallel buses will enable the short-
delay transfer of a significant amount of data to where it is 
needed. 
However, a wider examination of military technology 
development during this decade will show only two clearly new 
areas: great processing capacity and system integration. The great 
processing capacity which makes possible multi-purpose sensors, 
smart munitions and expert systems, is also a prerequisite for 
system integration. As a consequence of system integration 
complicated overall system operations can be automated and 
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thereby accelerated. The parts of the system, the individual 
weapons, can, if required, have their functions changed on short 
notice. Afterwards, if needed, they can return back to the overall 
system. In this way the coordination of parallel operations 
achieves a new dimension. 
This sort of course of development does not eliminate the 
need for a corresponding traditional weapons system. A main 
battle tank has to be aligned beside its protective armoured 
fighting vehicle because the weapons system development of 
main battle tanks is taking it towards becoming a mere anti-
armour weapon. Both of these, much like self-propelled artillery, 
require the direct protection of anti-aircraft units. The 
development, integration, and total control of this new overall 
system poses new types of challenges to those responsible for 
creating and maintaining modern combat forces. At the tactical 
level the new areas do not bring very dramatic changes, but at 
the operational level the one who is the controller of the 
applications development is, right from the starting point, more 
than a match for the opponent who is unskilled in this respect. 
The qualitative superiority of weapons and C3I-systems will, in 
the next decade, be brought about through the better control of 
software and planning tools. However, a precondition for bringing 
this about will be the investment of substantial economic resources 
towards the achievement of these ends. 
So despite the rapid pace of development there will not be 
seen in the near future any new types of overall systems. For 
example, the outward appearance of main battle tanks and 
helicopters will be the same as before. But, on the other hand, if 
the basic function of the system remains more or less unchanged, 
no change in key concepts is possible. That is why, for example, 
essential parts of the television receiver in 2005 will resemble 
those from its half century old predecessor, even though the 
technological solutions arrived at since then should have made it 
appear quite different. 
The fundamental human basis of development directs its 
progress as powerfully today as before. The commander wants 
to see the battlefield and strike further than his opponent. 
Zeppelins and reconnaissance planes had the same task during 
the first world war that unmanned aerial vehicles and combat 
helicopters perform today. The main battle tank of that time 
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equaled in firepower that of a modern armoured fighting vehicle. 
A consequence of the post Second World War development of 
main battle tanks has been the birth of an anti-armour system 
based on hyper-velocity missiles. Developments involving the 
effects of stand-off weapons effectiveness, protection and cover 
as well as speed of movement also have a human basis. 
It should be borne in mind however, that the development 
tools of the new data processing technology also offer new 
possibilities for human innovation. As a result of this it will be 
possible to develop to the basic system such types of support 
applications that an outside observer would have difficulty even 
understanding what in reality is being developed. The 
introduction of such a system into combat, especially during its 
initial stages, could decisively change the developing 
arrangement. Though these types of innovations are mainly linked 
with electronic warfare, they can be found to have applications 
to the defensive components of the new weapons systems, such 
as the self protection system of main battle tanks. 
The dissimilarity between current weapons systems and 
those to be introduced in the future will be most pronounced at 
the level of their integration. Single pieces of heavy combat 
equipment, such as self-propelled artillery, will be converted 
into an independently functioning weapons system. With respect 
to rocket launchers or self-propelled artillery, the qualities that 
these overall systems will possess include, for example, own 
position determination and automatic communication of it, receipt 
of firing mission, choice of munitions, calculation of firing data 
as well as timing of firing. In principle, the implementation of 
these tasks will be capable of being carried out under all battlefield 
conditions, during the day or at night. Similar types of overall 
systems will be found in the latest main battle tanks. 
While the need for operating crews is reduced under this 
overall system their maintenance requirements are increased. 
The operating crew must be a thoroughly trained group and 
therefore not anyone at all will be fit to join it. In this respect the 
arrangement is rather paradoxical in that the training of operators 
for a system that itself will be determining complex tasks should, 
in principle, be easy. However, the integration of these overall 
systems eliminates the advantages obtained from single 
components of the system since the operator must master many 
different entities and, in general, it must be accomplished in a 
shorter time than previously. The complete automation of the 
integration would erode the flexible use of the system and would 
render it clumsy and vulnerable in unexpected operating 
situations. 	, 
The increased maintenance requirements will produce new 
problems in operating these systems. Because of the complicated 
technology employed the systems' average uninterrupted 
operating times will be shortened and the amount of required 
components will inevitably increase. Though the systems can 
contain continuous testing methods, these will not decrease the 
expanded need for maintenance. The maintenance occasions will 
be carried out rapidly if the required components are available. 
However, the maintenance organization attached to the combat 
troops on the battlefield can not implement measures that were 
not defined in advance. Thus the planning of systems' 
maintenance will become an even more important part of 
operational planning, nor will it be quickly possible to change its 
current basis. 
In addition to the aforementioned ways the deployment of 
stand-off weapons systems limits the flexibility of operations. 
When the operating distance is extended out to an unobservable 
area, the time-lag in appraising the information received from 
the target increases. Since the operating accuracy of a weapons 
system decidedly weakens as the time-lag increases, a way must 
be found either to freeze the target situation or preserve 
continuous tracking contact with the target. Through the 
deployment of deep effecting weapons this goal becomes difficult 
to achieve. Target situations are then to be obtained either from 
collecting static targets or the weapon system's warhead must be 
fitted with wide-ranging target homing missiles. The demand 
for continuous target contact will lead to the requirement of a 
scaling of distances and a target acquisition system comprising 
many elements. Because a modern target is capable of moving, 
the received information must be passed on without a time-
delay and be available for both decision making and for follow-
up involving battle damage. Such a system must have the 
capability to clarify the operations model and structure of the 
target as well as many different technological and systemic 
solutions whereupon, from the point of view of the usability of 
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the system, we are returned to the problems of integrated weapon 
systems. 
4.2 Factors influencing command and decision making 
Development toward integrated units is not possible without new 
data processing technology. In preparation for modern ground 
combat the troop commander must be capable of solving very 
conflicting demands. He must be capable of protecting his troops 
against modern intelligence and fire support systems, also against 
those that are effecting deep into his own territory. At the same 
time he must do everything in his power to deploy his troops in 
such a way that sufficient weapons effectiveness is made available 
to determine the course of battle. The second problem is directed 
towards the command and decision making processes. In the 
event that the opposing sides' intelligence and firepower 
capabilities are at the same level, advantage is to be sought 
through command and decision making processes that are either 
faster than the opponent's or timed in a different way. 
Conflict solution requires troop mobility since the protection 
afforded by fortifications would impede the flexible use of troops. 
Troop movement must be dispersed since great concentrations 
of men and equipment could be easily revealed by airborne 
intelligence and are very vulnerable even to inaccurate mass fire. 
The command of dispersed troops requires a knowledge of their 
status. In the event that the speed of movement is tens of 
kilometres per hour, then the status must be discerned in time 
intervals of less than half an hour. Because the operations and 
crushing firepower of an opponent may, in the space of minutes, 
transform the status of some troop units decisively, there must 
be maintained an ability to follow the course of the battle so that 
the necessary information could be relayed to troops at the tactical 
level in the space of minutes. The adaptation of this task to the 
system would not be possible without modern data processing 
technology. 
Traditional command and communications systems will 
expand into an integrated regional command, control, 
communications and intelligence system. With the aid of 
integrated C3I-systems composed of sensors, combat radios, 
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regional subscriber networks, data processing and decision 
making support systems, the commanders will have improved 
capabilities to determine the existing situation and thus implement 
appropriate measures. The regional deployment and command 
of troops will be flexible and quick. The breadth and depth of the 
mobile regional command-and-control system will cover an area 
of many tens of kilometres. Operational systems will be linked 
through networks with ranges of hundreds of kilometres. 
Necessary information can be transferred within a short time-lag 
to, for example, the chain of command at the battalion level, 
whose independent functional capabilities are thereby improved. 
However, a commitment to this type of overall system also affords 
opportunities to many types of countermeasures. To ensure that 
the command system maintains a functional capability, its data 
transfer system must be kept available through the application of 
several parallel systems employing different types of technology. 
With the aid of the decision making support systems — 
sophisticated war games and simulated models — the commander 
will have an easier time analysing the interaction of the systems 
in the given situation. Besides enabling an optimal integrated 
operation of the weapons systems, it will afford a greater 
possibility to exploit the opponent's weaknesses. Automated 
parallel processes will be drawn up based on the work routines 
and planning of staff which can be carried out as a continuous 
procedure. The changing principles upon which decision making 
is based will be able to be more quickly followed. In addition the 
freeing of the decision makers from their routines will enable 
them to direct their full capacities to innovative operational or 
tactical command. 
4.3 Development problems and factors influencing the scene of 
land combat 
In reviewing the previously examined areas of military technology 
it is notable to point out that not one developed weapon system 
has been able to meet the demands initially set out for it, nor to 
become completed in the planned time schedule, nor to remain 
within the cost constrictions set out for it. The nonfulfillment of 
these demands is mainly due to the fact that while individual 
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technological solutions might function in their desired way, the 
combining of many technologies is not feasible without significant 
compromise solutions. The more the types of solutions incorporated 
within a weapons systems, the greater the compromising of the 
technological possibilities being offered. The compromises are, of 
course, relative not absolute. They are chiefly precipitated by the 
need to keep the total dependability of the system at the desired 
level. This phenomenon influences, above all, the development of 
independent weapon systems, for example, mobile anti-aircraft 
systems, main battle tanks and field artillery launchers. 
The breaching of time schedules has, almost without 
exception, been connected to the prevailing marketing setup in 
which the competitive situation forces those responsible for 
development to take the risks involved in developing new key 
technologies. In view of the events taking place related to 
economic and international political development, the need to 
take such risks will be reduced. In its place, however, will arise 
problems involving the controlling of wide-ranging multinational 
projects. The exceeding of cost limits is hastened by the significant 
increase in research and development costs. This trend.will be 
maintained although equipment and methods will continue to 
develop. The most important reason for these high costs is the 
increase in time-consuming human labour while at the same 
time generational changes in certain areas of technology occur in 
the space of a few years. This phenomenon affects above all the 
elements upon which expert systems rely on. These are, among 
other things, the systems involved with the collection and analysis 
of intelligence data, the planning and optimizing systems for 
firing operations as well as sophisticated weapon system sensors. 
As a consequence of this cost development, the number of new 
systems will continue to be further reduced. 
The simultaneous existence of the above-outlined problem 
areas affects also conventional ground combat equipment in 
which development is operating alongside a similar factor — 
qualitative arms race. In certain areas — for example electronic 
warfare and defence against air-to-ground stand-off missiles — 
the movement is toward a situation in which an advantageous 
arrangement can be achieved through the employment of only 
marginal solutions. The basis of this is bound up with the 
excessively large amounts of different types of demands placed 
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on the weapons systems in which control of many different 
target situations is sought. The requirement that a single system 
fulfils many different tasks has already succeeded in suppressing 
some operationally functional development work. 
A similar course of development will also affect more 
traditional elements such as, for example, autonomous homing 
artillery projectiles and artillery anti-battery operations emanating 
from radar fire-control. However, it was shown during the 1980's 
that, owing to the economic factors involved, such types of 
competition produces no victor. While in many ways serving as 
a insufficient example for comparison, the Persian Gulf war 
showed above all the importance of the application of tried and 
tested basic solutions in relation to systems employing a marginal 
technological benefit. The most concrete example of the latter 
was offered by the not totally successful hunt for the mobile 
SCUD-B missile launchers as well as, above all, the operations of 
the much publicized anti-missile defence. 
In assessing the capabilities of the new ground combat 
systems the following points must therefore be borne in mind: 
The implemented solutions can not achieve as great an 
operational advantage as that which can be produced from a 
purely technical examination. The overall technical solutions 
that are arrived at are always compromises which besides 
containing the chosen strengths also contain essential 
weaknesses. 
* The incorporation of many technical systems into an optimal 
tactical system is possible only in theory. In poorly controlled 
conditions only a small part of the system's combat effect is 
realized. 
Not withstanding the disadvantageous factors just listed, the 
command and firing operations of independent and lightly 
manned mobile weapons systems are rapid. The activities of 
the troops are endeavored to be tied to their optimized operations 
so that the role of lightly armed infantry will be concentrated to 
secondary tasks. These will primarily involve protection of 
different phases of attack as well as flank and rear protection. 
The effort to increase protection and security will decidedly 
narrow operational freedom of action. If basic key systems of 
mobility and firepower are not capable of being utilized, then 
the parts of the system which are optimized for protective 
43 
tasks remain weak with respect to also today's confluence of 
armoured power. The performance of the system is thus 
dependent on maintaining the capabilities of new key systems. 
Although the capacity of independent systems — artillery and 
anti-aircraft systems as well as helicopters and tanks — will 
grow, their valuableness and the reduction in their required 
numbers will lead to an increased need for cover. The 
elimination of such key systems would noticeably reduce the 
combat capabilities of the troops and their replacement on the 
battlefield would be difficult. 
The mobility and protective needs of the best troops extend 
out to all important systems. Artillery, mortars and mobile 
command posts are to be sufficiently armoured against bullets 
and the fragments emanating from light artillery. 
Effective intelligence, both general and target orientated, is a 
prerequisite for optimal operations. Without accurate 
intelligence data the achieved firepower loses its significance. 
Though intelligence equipment is not very vulnerable, it is 
however a neural network, the modern C3-system. 
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5 THE LAND COMBAT SCENE 
5.1 The points of departure, the increasing significance of time 
and data 
It is obvious that in spite of the development lines, ground combat 
will not approach the arrangementwhich has always predominated 
in air and sea combat. These are formed from individual elements 
whose activities can be controlled rather well on the strength of the 
laws of nature and observation. Air and sea combat, also on the 
modern battlefield, tend to develop into a competition involving 
technology and the superior utilization of it. In such cases key 
factors arise from the performance of sensors, the range and 
countermeasure capabilities of the weaponry as well as the reaction 
times of the systems. A borderline factor is naturally, the 
competence of the operator of the system. 
Ground combat seeks the same arrangement. However, since 
ground combat involves many more individual elements and so 
many varying arrangements, the straightforward assessment 
methods of sea and air combat can not be applied to ground 
action. Human factors are more clearly emphasized in ground 
combat, including those factors involved with drawing up false 
assessments. When these factors are combined with the many 
different methods to process the collected data, then it can be 
shown that decision makers, also in the future, will be bound up 
in the traditional fundamental ground combat problems. 
Data compiled from each individual situation can be used to 
form many different overall scenes in which none may necessarily 
be correct. To ensure the correctness of data the periods of data 
transmission are being ever shortened and frequently it is 
necessary to resort to sensory transmissions or electronically 
accompanied intelligence data. The more secure the method of 
receipt the more reliable the data. Skillful deception can send 
even an effective decision making system into disarray. This is 
because the reliance on automation reduces its flexibility. It should 
also be pointed out that in so far as the commander has a 
possibility to receive data from outside his own area, his interest 
may be directed toward entirely the wrong matter. 
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Traditional development effecting military technology has 
brought added firepower and speed as well as enhanced fire 
accuracy and range to ground combat equipment. This trend 
will naturally continue but at its side will arise enormous 
developments in systems enabling fire operations. This will have 
the effect of increasing the importance of data and, above all, 
time in relation to ground combat operations. These factors will 
alter the combat scene chiefly at the operational level. At the 
tactical level, especially with regard to close-combat situations, 
the battlefield will function quite similarly as it has in all previous 
wars. Then the importance of the performance of equipment 
relative to human will-power and competence will be decisively 
reduced. 
The significance of data is a complex question. Modern data 
systems can, within a short time-lag, transfer such an enormous 
amount of data, that it can overwhelm the operations of any 
organization. Therefore the filtering and handling of data increase 
as ever more important key factors in decision making. Decisive 
to all that has been stated in the foregoing is the accessibility and 
transferability of data. In so far as the tools for this are existing, 
then in a symmetrical duel the calculator will always win out 
over that which is human directed. For this reason the 
consequences of technological and cost development will be that 
the traditional most important elements of weapons systems - 
weapon launchers and warheads - will have a reduced 
significance in the future. 
Apart from data the most dominant factor is that of time. Its 
influence is stressed by the fact that data procurement and 
handling require time. Owing to the shortening of the handling 
and transfer times the procurement time emerges as the critical 
factor. Thus that side which possesses the more sophisticated 
intelligence system will achieve a decisive advantage if it has 
enough time to collect the information required for decision 
making. Time also quickly makes data obsolete. If the data is not 
updated as the situation changes, decision making becomes 
caught up with making estimations of what is the prevailing 
situation. The decision maker who is dependent on mere estimates 
of the situation upon which he is to make his judgements will 
naturally come off second best to the decision maker whose 
judgements are based on received data. The interval occurring 
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between the collecting of the data upon which the order will be 
based and the receipt of that order itself, also emphasises the 
significance of time. Thus the shortening of the time-lag in 
operations as well as the possession of data emerge as key factors 
in ground combat command. Time is a critical factor also in 
combat situations. The acceleration of the firing . rhythm of 
weapons systems will shorten the operating time of firepower as 
well as narrow the speed of advance and time of deployment of 
mobile troops during times of advance and deployment. 
Operating times of firepower will be able to be shortened to even 
a tenth and that for other activities to even a third. 
The development of this kind of technology also involves 
being committed to it. A consequence of this is that it is not 
possible to stick to the long-term development of only certain 
parts of the system but rather development of the overall system 
must be the final goal. A powerful firing system is ineffective 
without a functional intelligence mechanism. The benefits 
afforded by troop mobility can be realized only when their 
movements can be commanded and followed. The commitment 
to an integrated overall system also brings forth a second 
fundamental problem: if the critical parts of the system become 
inoperative it will be difficult to transfer its operations to a lower 
level, generally a manual system. This property constitutes the 
most vulnerable aspect of integrated overall systems. 
5.2 Range, operations model and the role of the individual 
In the near future the dominant feature of ground combat will be 
its depth. Firepower in particular can be extended out to a depth 
of tens of kilometres if the situation warrants. Accurate observable 
firing operations can be directed towards a distance of a hundred, 
even hundreds of kilometres. A precondition for this is the 
possession of sufficient target acquisition capabilities. Deep firing 
operations aspire to create a situation whereby the attacking or 
defending ground forces would come against troops that have 
suffered substantial losses or even, in extreme situations, meet 
forces that have already been put out of action. 
The capabilities afforded by intelligence will aspire to 
transform the command of combat situations into a kind of a 
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chess game. Target acquisition and position location capabilities 
as well as the deployment of precision guided weapons will alter 
the effectiveness of fire, its selectivity and the amount of firepower 
required. Thus the cost-effectiveness of firepower will be 
improved. The time factor will be transformed in such a way that 
whereas today the time-lag for received intelligence data designed 
for long-range firing operations can be between ten minutes and 
some hours,- it will, during the next decade, be shortened to a 
period of from one to ten minutes. The factors influencing decision 
making can, in extreme situations, be thus changed at the brigade 
level in the space of minutes. The shortening of all execution 
times thus develops into a central factor. 
This development will lead to a situation in which the 
objective of the use of a weapons system will be the selective, 
economical and certain neutralization or destruction of the enemy 
as well as ensuring the safety of one's own troops. It means the 
precise choosing and handling of the most important targets and 
the avoidance of unnecessary targets and the reduction of massive 
fire. At the same time it means taking advantage of your own 
technical strengths and your opponents shortcomings so that 
your own losses will be minimized. 
The compartmentalization of the battlefield i.e. its temporal 
and territorial separation, will become more pronounced. The 
aggressor will choose his time and place in such a way that he 
will avoid all those deployed forces whose defeat is not a 
prerequisite for the accomplishment of his task. He will endeavour 
through the effects of aircraft and stand-off weapons to cripple 
or limit the area of those troops which are not worth eliminating 
through the operations of ground forces. The versatility of the 
weaponry will afford possibilities for the optimal use of weapons 
systems in the most economical manner. The fundamental 
precondition for these operations is a smooth running intelligence 
system. 
When looked upon from the perspective of the individual 
combatant, operations will become more difficult. Heated round-
the-clock activity will be very strenuous for the soldiers and the 
range of the weapons systems will decrease the possibilities for 
cover on all battlefields. The acceleration of the pace of operations 
will impose increased demands for every combatant. The need 
for commanders to make quick decisions will be heightened by 
the simultaneous increase in the amount of information — 
including inaccurate information — to which he will have access 
to. The new technical equipment will require a high degree of 
competence from the operators — and also from their commanders. 
5.3 An example of an invader's mode of operation for land 
warfare 
Preparation for attack 
A modernly equipped military power preparing for attack will, in 
the first instance, employ existing ready troops. They are thus, at 
the tactical level, made up of standing forces. The simulated 
dividing up and deployment of the troops at the operational level 
is carried out through conventional war games as well as computer-
based combat models. The usage and selection of munitions is 
made to accommodate to the widest possible range of operating 
conditions. 
A prerequisite for the putting into place of these elements is 
an intelligence system that has, already during peace time, been 
engaged in continuous operations. Data collected with the aid of 
satellites is endeavored to be made more complete. This activity 
is carried out immediately after the decision to initiate military 
operations has been made. Though the reconnaissance phase 
attempts to minimize the creation of any possible surprise factors, 
in some situations it will be more important to ascertain a correct 
picture of the combat setting than to initiate a quick start-up of 
operations. In such a case that the defender has been able to 
reach a decisively heightened level of preparedness, it is more 
useful to bide one's time so that the target's course of action, 
organizations, key deployment areas and operational approaches 
can be better discerned and thereby used as a basis for operations. 
The lead troops being directed towards the main area of 
operations will be equipped with the best possible combat 
equipment. This will mean great reconnaissance capabilities, a 
quick reacting command system, great mobility on the part of 
the troops and their logistics units as well as a high degree of 
combat endurance. Besides relying on satellites, reconnaissance 
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will increasingly be based on aircraft, especially reconnaissance 
planes and unmanned aerial vehicles. Helicopters will be used 
for reconnaissance only in those type of situations in which it is 
unlikely that they would become a target for heavy anti-aircraft 
fire. Satellite reconnaissance will be concentrated towards fixed 
targets and structures as well as the defining of the fixed command 
system. The effect of these measures will be to decidedly lessen 
their significance in the events leading up to the initiation of 
mobile combat operations. An operational reconnaissance system 
will also be able to collect data from outside the selected combat 
area. The reconnaissance also performs a target acquisition role 
which will make possible short time-delayed firing operations 
against observed targets. This will signify a significant threat to 
the defender's troops being moved or already deployed to the 
theatre of combat. 
Operational reconnaissance is capable, in favourable 
conditions, of easily finding battalion-sized troops within the 
range of weapon systems. This process can be implemented even 
with battalion-sized forces. In open areas affording little 
protection, the longer term operations of companies — the duration 
of which can be many hours — becomes difficult to conceal. The 
time of day does not impose any decisive limitations on 
operational reconnaissance. Without the protection afforded by 
the shade of a forest, the mobile troops which are larger than 
company-sized can be detected throughout the chosen combat 
area by radar-based mobile target indicators. Electronic 
intelligence can crack in less than an hour a combat radio-based 
command system as well as locate the most important junctions 
to facilitate radio traffic analysis and direction finding. It also 
becomes quickly possible to ascertain the organization and combat 
division of the troops. Electronic harassment is thus integrated 
into the operation in such a way that its full effects are employed 
concurrently with a lethal application of weaponry. 
The aim of the first attack is the carrying out of operations 
employing all available forces for the purpose of quickly breaking 
the resistance of the enemy in the selected area. The time of 
attack is chosen in accordance with developments involving the 
state of the overall situation. The decisive initial phases of the 
operation are sought to be carried out in the dark. The focus of 
the offensive is directed towards those areas which can benefit 
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most from the mobility of the armoured troops. Such types of 
terrain are cultivated land and other firm-based open areas. In 
winter it would also be possible to exploit the opportunities for 
added mobility afforded by frozen bogs and waterways. A 
decisive factor in selecting the focus of attack is the need to 
insure the ability of the logistics system to perform its task. 
Air power plays an important role in the preparation and 
start-up phase of attack. The attacker will endeavour to achieve 
and maintain air superiority over the whole theatre of operations, 
especially during the decisive initial phase of combat. The use of 
air power, and especially the deployment of attack aircraft, seeks 
to prevent the defenders from mobilizing into deployed 
formations and to cripple those troops who have already deployed 
within the selected area. Air operations will at first be directed 
towards targets such as air-defence, the command system, 
maintenance units and artillery weaponry. Saturation of anti-
aircraft systems will be carried out through the deployment of 
unmanned aerial reconnaissance and target vehicles. Ground 
operations will be started-up at that point when the joint 
operations of long-range artillery and air power are no longer 
capable of improving the initial combat arrangement. 
Helicopters will be used chiefly for flanking tasks and in 
directing surprise operations involving deep-ranging 
reconnaissance and devastation. In combat involving a wide 
area, a substantial share of the available helicopters will be tied 
to tasks involving flank and rear protection. Helicopters equipped 
with ground surveillance radar will have the capability in sparsely 
covered terrain to follow the movements of even individual 
vehicles from a distance of tens of kilometres. This type of 
procedure will strive to prevent any type of deep-ranging surprise 
counterattacks being directed towards the flanking areas. In so 
far as air superiority is able to be maintained during the decisive 
phase of combat, it will be possible, also in the dark, to prevent 
relatively large detachments — comprising tens of vehicles — from 
moving in predominately open areas. It is especially endeavored 
to prevent the operations of those troops being directed towards 
operational counterattack. 
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The carrying out of an attack 
Through the utilization of armoured vehicles and air transport, an 
attacker seeks to obtain a level of mobile combat operations in 
which the first phase of action would make possible a military 
breakthrough or an encirclement of the defender. Following the 
first phase of operations, mobility would be maintained by 
confronting the defender with a continuous stream of new 
operational situations. The choice of the method of attack is also 
influenced by the defender's situation to the extent that the chosen 
method of action will seek to exploit deficiencies in the defender's 
state of readiness. A fundamental point of departure for this 
doctrine is that the defender's inability to fulfil these preconditions 
will prevent the initiation of combat. After the attacker has chosen 
the method of combat his resources become committed to its 
realization. In this regard special attention is to be focused on 
electronic warfare and concealment. Electronic warfare seeks to 
bring about an unexpected and wide-ranging disruption of 
command capabilities. Concealment is implemented during all 
operational phases and with all systems, including firing support 
and troop movements. 
In so far as mass deployment of direct-fired short-range 
anti-armour weapons facilitates attainment of the set goals, any 
attempt at achieving a breakthrough will only be undertaken by 
the rationally acting attacker if it is absolutely necessary. In this 
way it becomes possible to achieve the desired aims more quickly 
and with smaller losses. From the defender's point of view, a 
breakthrough at the front need not be fatal if it is directed towards 
a less dangerous sector, the attacker's ground communications 
are to be cut and one's own forces are quickly able to act against 
the breach. Encirclement, if it is based on a controlled situation 
and not the consequence of an unsuccessful operation, is the 
most difficult for these three arrangements since the attacker can 
command and direct his troops more quickly and freely when 
they are in contact with each other. 
Airborne operations carried out at the operational level are 
to be carried out only for the opening of a new front, although it 
can also be timed to precede the main attack. Through the 
employment of short time-lag command communications, its 
range of operations can be extended out to distances of even a 
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few hundred kilometres. However the area must have the 
capability of establishing receiving points for the receipt of the 
requisite maintenance and resupply materials that must 
accompany the operations. While maintenance materials can be 
supplied through the air, the available troops can be only lightly 
armed and thus be carrying out holding operations. Tactical 
airborne operations are likely only in those situations where one 
wants to ensure advancement through lightly defended or 
unopposed areas. It is endeavored to implement these tasks 
through the employment of firing operations which will quickly 
cover the same range as that which is to be covered by the 
tactical airborne operation. Whether the firing operations are 
carried out by helicopters or indirect fire, the resulting risk to 
personnel is minimal compared to the other forms of available 
firepower at the landing area. 
Amphibious operations into the rear of the defender are 
carried out at the operational level only when it has been included 
as part of the preliminary plan of operation. It ties down such a 
large number of forces for protective tasks that only a great 
military power employing its most important resources in every 
respect against a weaker force has the capability to carry out 
such an operation. 
The deployment area for the armoured detachments is to be 
situated in such a way that it is the very least, the distance of the 
range of the most long-range artillery weapon from which the 
combat is to be conducted from. The troops will be dispersed 
from the assembly area in such a manner that they will not reveal 
the magnitude of the forces concentrated nor will the deployment 
areas develop into destructive targets for sudden concentrations 
of fire. 
The armoured detachments will direct their reconnaissance 
to the combat area together with that intelligence emanating 
from the higher chain of command. Mainly carried out from the 
air it is above all target reconnaissance, upon whose strength the 
required firing operations are commenced. The great distances 
involved require the timing of operational reconnaissance to be 
started-up 3-4 days preceding the planned combat. Firing 
operations endeavour to create a situation on the battlefield which 
will be conducive to the attacker's operations model. These 
activities include the isolation of the combat area, the crippling 
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of air defences, the weakening of the operating possibilities of 
the command system and the prevention of electronic means of 
defence. At the tactical level the most important targets are those 
reserve forces capable of initiating counterattacks as well as field 
artillery. The simultaneous commencement of firing operations 
extending along the entire depth of the combat theatre will be 
started-up 1-2 days before the advancement of armoured troops 
into the area. The firing operations are not continuous but rather 
they are carried out as short bursts of fierce firepower emanating 
from changing firing locations. 
As a support element for the supplementing of the local 
command and position location systems, the dispersed armoured 
detachments will be moved to the combat area in a dispersed 
state. At the division level the troops will be directed to the 
combat area in, at most, battalion strength detachments in such a 
way that the channelling of the companies to the chosen attack 
avenue will occur beyond the reach of heavy mortar fire. At the 
same minimum distance will be mobilized those firing units 
supporting the attack and possessing the same tactical mobility 
as the attacking troops. Right behind the forward troops the self-
propelled artillery units will be mobilized to a state of alert 
before the arrival of the main troops. The firing units will join in 
to the firing operations preceding any breakthrough, the goal of 
which remains the crippling of the opponent's possibilities to 
pursue combat. 
As the combat progresses close-in fire support will be 
arranged in such a manner that the main forces could proceed 
without having to meet up with organized resistance from the 
opponent. The close-in fire would be supplied from the most 
long-range direct-fire weapons as well as helicopters fitted out 
with rockets. It is essential during this phase of operations that 
the anti-armour activities of the defender be crippled so that the 
firepower of the armoured fighting vehicles is put on a level 
basis in what otherwise is an unfavourable arrangement for the 
attacker. The purpose of the close-in phase of combat is to scatter 
the defender's troops and create holes for the next echelon of 
combat-ready troops to immediately go through. 
Small units possessing great firepower will be directed 
towards objectives whose destruction would most quickly deprive 
the defender of the capability to continue the battle. The activities 
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of these troops is to be protected by isolating the combat area 
beforehand and during advancement, through the quick closing 
off of threatening flanks by the deployment of mine barriers and 
guards possessing large amounts of firepower. It will also be 
possible to direct a fast reacting reconnaissance system to the 
most important areas. Even during the first phase of operations 
the desired objectives can be many tens of kilometres away. 
Owing to the range of reconnaissance and firing operations, 
advancement connected to one operation can be planned, even 
in difficult terrain, for distances over a hundred kilometres. 
The follow-up development of the situation is more difficult 
than the start-up of attack. Especially the limited scope for 
providing roads for advancing and maintenance reduces 
operational freedom of action and forces the closer keeping 
together of the troops than would otherwise be prudent. This 
hinders the precondition for a successful attack, namely the 
maintenance of a continuous momentum of movement. Sudden 
massive shifts in the focus of activities take plenty of time and 
require the commitment of a considerable portion of the troops 
to protective tasks. During this phase of operations the attacker 
is most vulnerable to all types of countermeasures. In so far as 
the attacker strives to attain his deepest objectives, he must remain 
on his chosen course. If his goal is the destruction of the defender's 
troops along a broad front, he must either disperse his combat 
forces or he must strive to concentrate them into a continuous 
echelon. The latter operations model is the more probable. 
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6 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
CHALLENGES FOR THE FINNISH 
LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE 
6.1 The Finnish land warfare doctrine and the factors which 
influence it 
In accordance with the territorial defence doctrine the land warfare 
doctrine, which in this work goes by the name of territorial combat, 
is put into effect by engaging an invader in combat right from the 
time he crosses the border. The power of the invader is to be 
weakened through the effecting of continuous losses to both his 
point and rear. The movements of the invader will be controlled by 
exploiting the possibilities offered by the terrain and preventing 
his access to the most important areas. Territorial combat thus 
develops into a series of combat operations that can extend to a 
depth of even hundreds of kilometres. The types of combat 
involved include guerilla operations, limited attacks as well as 
decisive strikes into enemy positions and a repulsing pattern of 
defence. Territorial combat obliges the invader to scatter his forces 
as well as forcing him to apportion a greater number of troops than 
usually would be required for flank protection. By committing the 
invader to a series of different combat operations he loses his 
freedom of action and is beaten by concentrating all available 
forces to the decisive battles. The formations and the troops 
attached to them will be used to take the initiative, to establish 
local superiority and to take part in the decisive combat 
engagements. The smaller regional troops will hinder the 
movements of an invader by carrying out continuous systematic 
combat operations. Combat operations aimed at repelling any 
attempt to subjugate the state can be initiated, if necessary, 
immediately upon the realization of any threat. 
The performance capability of the ground forces is dependant 
upon the warfare doctrine employed, the organization and 
equipping of the troops as well as the training and will to defend 
of the personnel. The land warfare doctrine is developed in 
accordance with the chosen main military doctrine in such a way 
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that the warfare doctrine determines those principles which are 
followed in combat operations. 
The doctrinal basis of the territorial defence system derives 
from the particular circumstances of Finland; the general 
educational level of the population, a large pool of trained 
reserves, the distribution of the population, the breadth of the 
country, the topography and quantity of road networks as well 
as flora and weather conditions. A well educated population 
spread out through all parts of the land possesses the capability 
to exploit the other particular circumstances of the country. The 
breadth of the territory enables flexible deep territorial combat. 
Factors related to topography and the quantity of available road 
networks limit the capabilities of an invader to direct his 
movements both on land and along the coast which together 
with the effects of flora decisively influence the possibilities to 
secure cover for the troops. Weather and the great changes in 
weather conditions fundamentally affect the operations of 
technical systems whose capabilities have not been tested in such 
conditions. That party who can fully utilize the possibilities 
afforded by these particular circumstances will enjoy a decisive 
advantage compared to the party who is unaccustomed to 
operating in such an environment. 
The advantageous factors afforded by the terrain are the 
cover that is provided over a wide area and the great numbers of 
coniferous trees, the shade cover offered to the roads, the small 
size of open areas and lack of open areas as well as the large 
numbers of waterways and the difficulties attached to the crossing 
of their banks. These factors restrict the movements of the 
armoured troops and in most cases direct them to areas where 
advancement is possible only at the pace of a foot soldier and the 
range of direct-fired weaponry can be measured in tens rather 
than hundreds of metres. For the same reasons frontal attacks by 
the armoured troops are, with the exception of a few relatively 
small areas, very difficult to carry out. The slowing down of the 
pace of operations stresses the significance of mass in both firing 
operations as well as the formation of alternative operations 
models for the troops. Mobile combat, especially classical tank 
battles, is not possible except in open areas which, outside of 
Lapland, are found only in a few places in Finland. 
Besides affording protection from optical reconnaissance, 
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the natural cover of the terrain also offers protection against 
optronic and radar surveillance. The scale of observable distances 
even off main roads is generally only a few hundred metres at 
most. The effective use of thermal imagers during summer 
conditions is limited by the tree stands and thick ground cover 
which extends from all observable directions. While these factors 
do no prevent the operations of reconnaissance systems, they 
significantly limit the use of weapons systems based on contrast 
discrimination. The systematic probing for individual mobile 
targets in covered forest terrain ties up an excessively large 
amount of capacity in relation to the benefit accrued. For over 
two-thirds of the year the sky in Finland is overcast. For almost 
half of this period the amount of damp particles in the air is so 
great that optronic reconnaissance and the use of optronically-
based weapons is prevented. 
The foliage of the trees will continue to influence the 
capability to locate static targets. This will also affect the operations 
of radar frequency sensors which are to be introduced in the near 
future. The amount of false alarms emanating from the radars of 
precision guided weapons clearly increases over waterways and 
in snowy conditions. Viewed as a whole, it can therefore be seen 
that the operations of also the new precision guided weapons 
against mobile individual targets, such as for example weapons 
intended to destroy main battle tanks, will be possible only in 
certain areas. It would also be difficult for precision guided 
weapons to have an effect on tactical command stations that 
were situated in wooded terrain. On the other hand, fixed 
structures such as bridges and key fortifications will, conditions 
permitting, be susceptible to destruction. 
The cover afforded by the terrain as well as snowy conditions 
will also essentially weaken weapons effectiveness. Their 
explosion at tree tops or the effects of snow cover would dissipate 
almost all the relative performance advantages of cluster bombs 
in relation to that achieved from conventional fragmentation 
grenades. A considerable amount of the effectiveness of direct-
fired weaponry is dissipated upon the branches of trees. The 
most effective weapon that could be employed by a main battle 
tank operating in typical Finnish terrain would be a fragmentation 
grenade. However, owing to the course of current development 
this weapon is being withdrawn from the range of available 
munitions. From the point of view of fire control, the reinstatement 
of fragmentation grenades to the range of available munitions 
would not be devoid of problems. This is because the thermal 
imager-based aiming system works by locking onto a target 
which gives off a clear contrast to its surroundings. Terrain objects 
do not form a sufficient degree of contrast. 
Besides being influenced by terrain cover, the operations of 
C3I-systems are also especially affected by electromagnetic 
disturbances. Besides affecting the navigation system, these 
disturbances also influence the transfer of all data. The operating 
distances of reconnaissance and weapon systems data links as 
well as the operations distances of communications systems links 
are both reduced. Occasional powerful disturbances can cut off 
real time data transfer connections for brief periods. 
6.2 Starting points and preconditions for development 
of the warfare doctrine 
It is paradoxical that the development of weapons systems and the 
warfare doctrine attached to them is shaping the battlefield still 
more according to the points of departure of territorial defence. In 
addition the universal development trends tend to clarify the 
development of the Finnish land warfare doctrine. 
In meeting the challenges one must pay attention to Finland's 
limited economic resources. These limitations impose the first 
restrictive condition concerning development: the development 
of the Finnish land forces can not be directed towards symmetrical 
systems and operations models that are to be deployed against 
all types of threat scenarios. Development is therefore to be 
aimed to those sectors which are capable of being developed in 
accordance with the warfare doctrine concept. The conclusions 
of this study also assume that the development can be carried 
out roughly within the bounds of the currently available resources 
and that the possibilities afforded by the development trends are 
presented in a relatively optimized fashion. It can be assumed as 
a point of departure however, that an invader will possess a 
wider-ranging and more versatile intelligence capability, a wider-
covering electronic warfare capability as well as greater mobility 
and firepower with respect to units and numbers of troops. 
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Fundamental challenges consist of doctrinal problems of 
warfare and their inverse form up those factors giving advantage. 
Despite the advantages obtained from terrain, the operational 
operations model of an invader will become difficult for a 
defender if it can be carried out unhindered. A static, inflexible 
low-level defence arrangement requiring long preparation time, 
will always be breached by an invader utilizing modern land 
combat techniques. The great mobility of the armoured units 
prevents the defender from using individual units more often 
than once in the same combat setting. With reconnaissance and 
firing operations extending deep into areas, the need for cover 
from the rear is almost as great as it is for those units engaging in 
combat at the front. The surprising start-up of combat in which 
all elements come together in a striking display of firepower, 
may produce such types of shock effects that will cause the 
crippling of combat capabilities in especially those troops 
engaging in combat for the first time. The operations described 
can be started-up in all weather conditions though their ability to 
be maintained at the same level throughout combat requires 
good visibility. 
The challenges are endeavored to be met through the 
elimination of the most important factors affording advantage, 
by striking at the weaknesses of a modern aggressor. In so far as 
an effectively operating modernly armed aggressor is permitted 
to carry out his concepts, his performance capabilities will be 
sufficient to carry out the planned operations. Therefore the goal 
of operations must be the continuous obstruction and harassing 
of the aggressor's attempts to carry out his systematic activities. 
The ground forces, whose basis is a large pool of reserves 
with the will to defend their country, have a higher resistance to 
the losses that would be inflicted by a modern aggressive power. 
They also would afford the possibility for alternating and parallel 
operations of troops. The significance of these points is greatly 
heightened as the duration of operations increases and it becomes 
a powerful factor approximately a week after the initial sequence 
of combat. A corresponding significance is displayed by the 
relatively large size of the troop organizations. In close-combat 
situations quantitative relative strength, which is a more important 
factor than quality, also afford possibilities for the quick 
deployment of temporary reserves. Owing to this quantitative 
factor, it is possible to achieve a decided local superiority in 
close-combat situations which serves to reduce losses. The first 
fundamental element of ground combat will, also in the future, 
be the endeavoring to force the aggressor into close-combat 
situations. 	 , 
The aggressor's greater speed of movement in many combat 
settings prevents the traditional delaying operations in which 
the troops are deployed on many levels to the same combat area. 
However, the great quantity of troops enables them to form up 
into echelon formations from which operational delaying can be 
carried out. In place of the traditional delaying operations, the 
surprising strikes of mobile heavily armed combat detachments 
can delay the operations of an aggressor for days and thus further 
the effort of other troops to achieve combat readiness. A second 
fundamental element of ground combat of the future will be the 
attempt to freeze the movements of an aggressor in the combat 
area right from its front edge. 
Mass use of firepower will be required to freeze the 
movements of an aggressor. If the movement of an aggressor is 
frozen he must mass his firepower which will further slow down 
his operations. At the same time it creates a symmetrical 
arrangement which, deviating from what was previously 
presented, is advantageous to the defender. The terrain also 
makes it possible to direct the movements of the aggressor by 
indirect methods. The construction of mine barriers is more 
advantageous for the party seeking to slow down the tempo of 
movement than to the one who is striving to maintain it. This 
idea holds true for both long prepared as well as quick arising 
situations. That type of terrain from which advancement is 
difficult affords advantages for surprise for those troops who can 
adapt their tactical mobility accordingly. A fundamental 
requirement for operational mobility is the capability to cross the 
large numbers of difficult waterways. 
The depth of the combat area both enables as well as requires 
the creation of regional C3I and logistics systems. When conditions 
and possibilities are well-known and when peace-time 
preparations can be made freely, these systems can be kept 
functional also when the main attack has already passed through. 
A regional reconnaissance system enables accurate deep firing 
operations which can also be carried out without the need for 
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real time aerial-directed target reconnaissance. Those key areas 
deemed as essential from the standpoint of the aggressor's 
operations can be monitored and controlled by small regional 
units whose discovery and crippling would lead to the 
commitment of substantial resources. 
Anti-aircraft and especially anti-armour operations can 
partially be organized along regional lines. Regional anti-aircraft 
operations increase the operating distances of fire support 
helicopters and ground attack planes and thus lessen their 
operating time in the target-area. Portable anti-aircraft systems 
can, in low altitude operations directed toward the chosen area, 
inflict substantial losses and thus render air activities unsafe. 
Regional anti-armour operations can produce continuous losses 
for an aggressor bringing troops to the combat area. The 
advantageous flank firing stations afforded by the terrain and 
the short firing distances afford possibilities for the destruction 
of also modern main battle tanks by portable anti-tank weapon 
systems. A precondition for the expeditious operation of a regional 
system is a functional command system. 
6.3 Development of the warfare doctrine 
Weakening of military power, movement control 
In concentrating his troops in a limited operating area, the attacker 
leaves open wide areas to his rear which can be utilized for the 
start-up and maintenance of territorial combat. Operating as a part 
of territorial combat, guerilla activities are immediately started-
up to the rear of the invader. These continuous operations can only 
be carried out by small units. Company-sized units can advance 
through the terrain to the selected area and start-up surprise 
operations from the range of light weapons' fire. For the strike to 
gain its maximum indirect benefit, it should be directed towards 
combat service troops, the equipment required for command and 
electronic warfare as well as artillery and reconnaissance or armour 
points. 
The carrying out of surprise operations leading to the 
extensive destruction of armour protected targets requires wide- 
62 
range utilization of light disposable anti-armour weapons. More 
weakly protected targets, such as the centres and link 
emplacements of C3I-systems and especially maintenance and 
transport establishments, are capable of being influenced also by 
light weapons. The significance of the service sector as a key 
target is heightened due to the fact that the new technology 
requires special servicing and armoured vehicles require great 
amounts of fuel. In addition also random strikes could decisively 
influence the situation. On the other hand, strikes against fortified 
command systems will require continuous systematic operations. 
The optimal effectiveness of light disposable anti-armour 
weapons is achieved against stationary or slowly-moving vehicles. 
The aggressor, for his part, tries to avoid such attempts. This 
situation can be changed through the massive deployment of 
mine barriers. The retarding effect on movement in difficult 
terrain is thus significant. However, their construction requires 
much time and labour. Mine barriers and other obstacles are to 
be built as part of the overall preparation for combat. If this is not 
possible, owing to time and factors related to cover, the focal 
point of .massive mine laying operations becomes the depth of 
the combat area itself. 
The previously presented targets will not progress without 
a moderate degree of air cover and safety measures. Helicopter 
patrols which can be quickly directed to different areas hinder 
the operations of guerilla units during all times of the day if 
weather conditions are favourable. This means that the operations 
of the guerilla troops can not be based on a wide-ranging use of 
all-terrain vehicles suitable for use over terrain, which therefore 
limits their area of operations. Anti-aircraft protection is essential 
for the prevention of crushing losses. It can be regionally 
organized through the use of portable systems. 
A precondition for surprise and continuous guerilla 
operations is the ability to obtain a short time-lagged picture of 
one's own area. It becomes especially important during that 
phase of operations when the attacker's lead troops cross over 
into the selected area of operations. During this phase the regional 
intelligence system serves at the same time as the reconnaissance 
and deep fire control arm for guerilla detachments. This kind of 
system can only operate through the support rendered by a 
regional command system. 
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The range of cooperation with the mobile units will vary 
depending on the phase of operations as well as the extent of the 
combat area. During the initial phase of combat, cooperation is 
coordinated carefully and in detail. It will include a dividing up 
of the areas of responsibility, logistics and transport arrangements 
as well as mine laying, firing operations and allotment of targets. 
As the range of distances increases the most important areas of 
cooperation will involve reconnaissance and fire support. Fire 
support can be used to exploit those favourable phases of combat 
in which, owing primarily to the demands of time, it is not 
possible to deploy guerilla units. In addition to a regional C3I-
system, such operations call for a firing system which can cover 
tens of kilometres and whose lethality is also sufficient to pierce 
light armour. Such a system could also be used as a quick mine 
laying device in indirect support of the operations of the mobile 
troops. 
The organizing of the operational troops 
The importance of protection for those troops engaged in the 
decisive phases of land warfare is underscored during the initial 
phase of regional combat. The troops seek protection through 
fortified positions in so far as this can be carried out without 
revealing the design of future operations. If this is not possible, 
then the most mobile troops must be protected through dispersion 
and by keeping them on the move in areas affording cover. Both 
operational models provide for the deployment of reserves who 
are capable of movement. So that this could be flexibly carried out, 
the formations should be capable of forming up for their planned 
combat tasks in the required fashion. 
In both operational models the most important tactical 
principle is that of initiative. For those formations concerned 
with defensive tasks initiative signifies, with respect to the range 
of firepower, that the most important repellent effect can be 
directed out of the range of direct-fire weapons. This requires the 
formation to be joined up to a regional C3I-system. In performing 
its task the formations must be prepared to continue the combat 
also in the very likely event that a deep strike of the aggressor 
separates the troops from each other. For the mobile troops 
initiative would mean that their strength would extend to such 
areas from which a preventative counterattack could be initiated 
to halt the movement of the aggressor. The type of operations 
presented by these threat scenarios cannot be carried out by 
whole formations but rather by units comprising of one or two 
battalions. Both operational models stress an independent 
operating capability by the formation's lower chain of command, 
a precondition for which is the greatest possible amount of 
indirect-firepower. 
For reasons involved with training, it is not appropriate to 
create more than two or three types of battalions. In support of 
these tactical formations there could be established an uniform 
framework, based on a staff and support unit. The uniform 
framework can be formed in such a way that it will enable the 
command of the formation's troops also after they have carried 
out their own mutually independent tasks. Such a structure 
affords the possibility to, for example, quickly move into two 
operational sub-formations or combat detachments. The benefit 
of this type of solution is underscored during the initial phase of 
battle. The troops carrying out their combat tasks will be 
dispersed. The ability of these units to continue the fight, if 
necessary while cut off, requires above all sufficient independent 
reconnaissance and fire support capability. The achieving of these 
ends likewise requires a regional C3I-system. The formations 
which are divided along organizational command model and 
systematic lines, can be flexibly assembled into appropriate 
formations for new concentrations of troops. 
The formations, which are organized in accordance with 
their assigned tasks, can be employed as operational formations 
when their capability for movement enables the carrying out of 
operations over a deep area. Regional formations will be 
established for those tasks in which operational mobility is not 
absolutely necessary or, because of the equipping of the troops, 
not possible. The regional formations can, on the basis of the 
previously mentioned principle, be divided up into smaller units 
capable of carrying out combat activities. Over wide areas of 
open territory this process becomes even a necessity. 
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Snatching the initiative and the decisive battles 
A situation in which the aggressor has a more favourable basis for 
snatching the initiative can only be resolved by influencing the 
picture of the situation. When the movement of the aggressor is 
retarded it becomes easier, even with small units, to take the 
initiative using surprise strikes. However, if the results of the 
strike are to be successfully exploited, the force carrying out the 
strike must be at least of battalion-sized strength. The defensively 
deployed formations must be able to quickly direct a mobile 
battalion deep into the aggressor's flank. This phase of combat 
requires that all operations be concentrated towards supporting 
the deep strike. A prerequisite for success during the decisive 
close-combat phase of the operations is weakening of the 
aggressor's direct-fire capability. For this reason an important task 
of the attack-supporting firing operations is the crippling of a great 
part of the aggressor's armoured vehicles. 
In areas where defensive battles can not be successfully 
carried out either large-scale deep surprise attacks or operations 
designed to entrap the aggressor will be attempted. Large-scale 
surprise attacks require that the selected area of operations extend 
out to many tens of kilometres so that the effects of artillery 
systems can be fully realized over the area. A maximum of one 
battalion can be used in the direction of the surprise attack but 
the troops will advance to the area in company-sized detachments. 
The ability of the mobile troops to achieve a simultaneous effect 
requires the support of both a regional C31-systern and 
predetermined operations and plans of action. An appropriate 
degree of regional mine laying is more important in such an 
operations model than the traditional defensive combat. 
Achieving a surprise effect would require the laying of mines at 
a speed which is beyond the capabilities of human labour. 
An operational entrapment operation links together large-
scale surprise attacks to a repellent defence and by that means 
the operations of regional formations to that of the operations of 
operational formations. Surprise attacks can be directed deep 
within the aggressor's lines, but basically they form the second 
phase of combat. A central element of this operations model is 
the capability of the troops assigned to repellant defence 
operations to maintain their capability to function. A requirement 
for this is the ability to decisively weaken the aggressor's 
firepower, especially artillery. Local defensive superiority will 
be concentrated over a narrow area only when the terrain or 
other conditions are exceptionally advantageous. 
The above-mentioned solutions impose such challenges, that 
it becomes difficult at this phase of combat to allocate other 
operational concepts. To preserve the operational capabilities of 
the most important troops also for the next operation, the attacks 
should strive above all to disperse the structures of the aggressor 
while at the same time to maintain one's own freedom of action. 
This means that the attack does not strive to attain the widest 
objectives but rather to perform a local surgical operation. The 
more decisive the area of operations, the greater the strength that 
will be directed towards it. 
In all instances the key factor is the advanced build-up of 
the combat sections and troop deployments. Also fire units are to 
be formed up for support of these operations from an area whose 
selection anticipates the dividing-up of the tactical formations. 
Especially the wide dispersal of artillery requires the reliance on 
a regional C3I-system. The anticipation of events as well as the 
partitioning of the troops also facilitates disengagement from 
combat. When the defender's control over the situation is 
inadequate, great numbers of the aggressor's men can become 
tied down in defensive action through the powerful fire from 
small troop units. To avoid these units from becoming bound to 
a fruitless frontal battle, the regional formations must have the 
capability to initiate limited counterattacks. The troops intended 
for these operations could thereafter disengage from the combat 
and move to their new task. 
Whenever a situation arises decisive battles, with the aim of 
locally destroying or defeating the aggressor, will be set in motion. 
The troops directed to the focus of the attack will be gathered 
from previously disengaged or unused operational formations. 
In the flanks and particularly in the depth of the aggressor, 
regional formations will also be assembled for decisive battles. A 
prerequisite for the successful performance of this combat is the 
crippling of the aggressor's total organization. 
Several formations will be concentrated to the decisive 
battles. Some of them will have to be moved to the area from 
great distances. The process of integrating them will take time 
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and their arrival at a favourable point of time may be difficult. 
This stage of activity again emphasizes the protection of the 
troops. For this reason the operational formation's anti-aircraft 
arm must have the capability to move with the troops as well as 
to cover them in any given area. The dispersal of the troops 
makes this requirement impossible in certain phases of operations. 
During these periods air cover is to be achieved through passive 
means and also by relying on the widest possible use of fixed 
structures. 
The required stores of munitions must be secured for the 
decisive battles. In addition, that equipment which is damaged 
during combat or in other ways becomes unusable must be put 
back into working order. The setting up of a regional maintenance 
system for use in the decisive battles is also one of the greatest 
challenges for regional combat planning. Because of the unfamiliar 
terrain and selected operation models, the challenge is still greater 
for the aggressor. 
The challenges for warfare doctrine that have been just 
portrayed are exacting for any military power. They contain both 
conflicting demands and considerable problems. Conflicting 
demands come about for example when the tactical lower chain 
of command should become independent as far as firepower is 
concerned just at the same time when the establishment of 
superiority would require concentrated firepower. The role of 
deep firing operations, above all from artillery, is of increased 
importance. At the same time these become important targets for 
the aggressor's air power as well as radar fire-controlled artillery. 
To protect them they thus must be either mobile or capable of 
being fortified. While the main protective resources are being 
committed to the troops operating in the combat area, also those 
troops who at the same time advance to the combat area must be 
protected. The problems of fortification are relevant in this context, 
too. Large-scale construction of fortifications requires great 
amounts of time also when they are done in a mechanized way. 
Because of this they can be easily detected by modern 
reconnaissance systems. However, successful combat in depth 
requires the quick support afforded by fortified positions. 
A basic requirement for the operating of a regional logistic 
system is the ability to protect the system, above all by keeping it 
secret. This task, however, requires considerable preparation. 
The regional air defence system is restricted to its chosen operating 
area, which does not necessarily coincide with the area of 
operations of the aggressor's air power. The regional C3I-system 
must be able to protect itself from electronic intelligence and 
from subsequent measures, jamming and weapons effect. A 
decisive question is also the time of day when the combat occurs. 
Darkness creates insolvable problems for the side which is 
unaccustomed to the terrain. The massive use of night vision 
devices will however facilitate operations over terrain. Thermal 
imager reconnaissance directed from the air is, owing to the 
greater contrast difference afforded by darkness, even easier to 
carry out than a similar operation during the day. 
7 FINAL ASSESSMENT 
Military technology is focusing on new key areas. Developments 
in micro-electronics enable a continuous stream of new solutions. 
These, for their part, increase the need and possibilities for 
applications development and also for individual algorithms 
which direct the more critical operations of systems. From the 
point of view of the user, the development will culminate with the 
task of controlling still more difficult operations in a more simple 
operating environment. This willbe arrived at onlyby dramatically 
increasing the automation of processes, whereupon the share of 
human judgements will correspondingly diminish. At the strategic 
and operational levels of systems, this trend is a necessity and 
produces clear benefits for those relying on them. At the tactical 
level these advantages strongly decrease as the distance to the 
opponent diminishes. Close combats will also in the future be 
fought soldier against soldier. Therefore that party which is 
endeavoring to achieve a technological advantage will try to avoid 
this arrangement. 
Systems integration and enhanced data processing capability 
will change the dimensions of land combat. System development 
at the operational level will during the next decade endeavor to 
increase distances by ten fold and to divide the time period to 
one-tenth of what it currently is. In so far as these factors are not 
tied to particular circumstances they may also be realized. 
Nevertheless, examined already during the planning stage, they 
will lead to fairly straightforward and therefore predictable 
operations models. The great question mark will however remain 
the starting-up of operations which can be simultaneously carried 
out almost within the entire depth of the battlefield and with 
many different types of effecting methods. 
The large-scale introduction of new types of technologies is 
possible only for a great power. The high cost of the new 
integrated systems will limit their numbers more effectively than 
the conventional arms agreements that have so far been 
concluded. Thus the amount of combat troops will decrease 
while at the same time the relative share of the most valuable 
elements of these troops will increase. 
If the previously presented factors are examined with the 
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aid of the Lanchester combat model, they produce some 
interesting results. The replacement of quantity by quality factors 
will weaken the combat strength of the troops which must be• 
compensated through changing the time dimension. Increasing 
the range will mean altexing the time dimension. However, when 
approaching the close-combat phase the fire-producing capability 
must be increased so that this advantage is capable of being 
maintained. On the basis of the models, the pursuit of an opponent 
who possesses similar systems require a similar quantity of these 
systems. Though the defender as such has the advantage, it is not 
very significant in combat which is based on movement. 
On the basis of this simplified examination it does not pay 
to try to obtain symmetrical models with the limited resources 
available. Rather the advantages are to be found from within the 
existing basic structure and from well developed original 
operations models. For Finland these structures are the breadth 
of the territory, terrain, weather conditions and a great quantity 
of land forces. When combined, these factors fundamentally alter 
the solutions obtained when compared with symmetrical 
arrangements. However, they require some basic factors. These 
are the direction of the movements of an attacker and the freezing 
of them, the consuming of his strength and the defeating of his 
operations models as well as the protecting of one's own forces. 
To maintain these basic elements one must be capable of evading 
the ever more efficient intelligence systems. 
The special conditions of Finland as well as the arrangements 
portrayed underscore the importance of the human factor. 
Operational models must be drawn-up in a manner that is 
different from that which is common elsewhere. In this way the 
decisive surprise factor can be maintained also when the forces 
are, also from the point of view of intelligence, operating from 
positions of inferiority. In territorial combat the surprise factors 
are guerilla operations, deep surprise attacks and entrapping the 
enemy. So that these operations can be flexibly carried out, the 
importance of deception should be underscored in all. operations. 
An individual acts differently in an operation involving deception 
than one in a normal situation. Also the fundamental components 
of the total integrated system — the C3I-system and service units — 
whose significance raises their importance as a prime target for 
countermeasures, aim for the same goal. 
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As a doctrine which is well planned, well developed and 
well instilled into the troops, the Finnish land warfare doctrine 
fully meets the demands set out by the main military doctrine. 
However, its development also requires the utilization of some 
of the latest technical solutions. With regard to the newest weapon 
systems, development will be concentrated around such key 
systems which will bring the greatest possible defensive capability 
for the least possible cost. For the land forces this will mean a 
heightened role for mobile anti-aircraft and long-range anti-
armour weaponry. With regard to those key weapon systems 
which will effect to the outcome of combat, quality is a more 
significant factor than quantity. This is because they must have 
the capability to also exploit those type of threat scenarios in 
which momentary superiority will be achieved with a marginal 
difference in performance capability. However, one complete 
system requires both quality and quantity. The commanding of 
operations on the battlefield portrayed will not be successful for 
the defender without a C3I-system which is capable of functioning 
also in difficult situations. The large-scale regional application of 
this kind of system will play an extremely central role in creating 
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DOCUMENTATION 
THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF FINLAND 
Statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish 
Defence Forces Admiral Jan Klenberg 
Seminar on Military Doctrine, Vienna, 9 October 1991 
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN EUROPE 
Finland welcomes the rapid progress made in building a new pattern 
of security relations in Europe, based on military openness and co-
operation. A vital element in this transformation is the reduction and, 
eventually, elimination of offensive capabilities, and the introduction 
of stabilizing measures. They remove disparities and suspicions that 
were connected with the divided Europe. Significant steps in this regard 
have been taken since we last met in this hall one and a half years ago. 
The profound political, military and economic changes underway in 
Europe testify to the will of peoples and the commitment of their 
Governments to fully implement jointly agreed principles and ideals. 
But they also pose new challenges for European States. It is vital that 
we establish an efficient and credible crisis management capability for 
the CSCE. We should also be ready to develop further mechanisms for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
The Paris Charter, the CFE Treaty, the Vienna. Document 1990 as well 
as the decisions taken at the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council are all 
important achievements in creating conditions for stability and security 
in Europe. 
Parallel to hopeful signs, developments since the CSCE Summit have 
also given rise to concern. Conflicts, even full-scale armed hostilities 
are facts in today's Europe. Finland fully supports the efforts of the 
European Community and the CSCE to achieve a lasting ceasefire and 
a peaceful solution in the Yugoslav crisis. 
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Innovation in enhancing stability should characterize the security 
negotiations to be started after the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992. 
We foresee a broad and flexible agenda for the new post-Helsinki 
forum, covering, as appropriate, reductions and constraints as well as 
measures for openness and transparency. Subregional security 
arrangements should be facilitated. In this context, the involvement of 
all countries responsible for European security is the strength of the 
CSCE. 
The rapid pace of change in Europe highlights the value of a regular 
dialogue as well as the significance of enhancing conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. In this respect, the Conflict Prevention 
Centre in Vienna is a potentially valuable instrument. 
FINLAND'S SECURITY SITUATION 
Pursuing a policy of neutrality, Finland is an active participant in the 
CSCE process. The core of Finland's neutrality is non-membership in 
military alliances. Through this national security arrangement, we can 
best protect our own interests and contribute to regional and 
international stability. 
The Finnish Government declared in September 1990 that the 
stipulations of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty concerning Germany, and 
those limiting Finland's sovereignty had lost their meaning. 
As a consequence of the end of the division of Europe and in connection 
with the changes in the Soviet Union and its republics, Finland will be 
negotiating a new contractual basis for the relations with its eastern 
neighbour, the Soviet Union as well as the Russian Federation. It is our 
aim that these agreements will meet the interests of the parties, in 
accordance with the principles jointly agreed in Europe, and confirm 
the continuation of their good neighbourly relations. 
The basic tenets of Finland's geostrategic position have remained 
unaltered, while new opportunities and challenges have emerged in 
our security environment. 
The CFE Treaty has made a historic contribution in the elimination of 
the threat of surprise attack and reducing the danger of great power 
war in Europe. The emphasis of the CFE Treaty was placed on the 
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security problems of Central Europe. It is in our interest that the Treaty 
be fully implemented in the northern flank as well. We expect that our 
northern subregion will fully benefit from future arms control treaties. 
The Nordic region has retained its traditional stability. Every opportunity 
should be used to strengthen the security of all States in the Baltic Sea 
region. 
The recently concluded START Treaty will have a positive effect on 
global security. From the Nordic perspective, we must note that the 
Treaty appears to increase the relative weight of the airborne and 
maritime legs of the nuclear triad. This will stress the continued strategic 
significance of the northwestern part of the Soviet Union and the adjacent 
northern waters — not far from Finland. 
We welcome the initiatives taken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev 
on mutual unilateral withdrawal and elimination of U.S. and Soviet 
land-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. Such measures 
would contribute to stability in our subregion. 
THE TASKS OF THE FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES 
The tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces can be divided into two major 
categories: (1) protection of Finland's territorial integrity and (2) the 
defence of the country in case of aggression. As far as various non-
military threats — for instance, major disasters and movement of people 
in large numbers — are concerned, the role of the Defence Forces is 
limited to supporting other authorities. 
The importance of naval and air defence has become emphasized in 
territorial surveillance and protection of territorial integrity. The Finnish 
Army, for its part, plays a decisive role when it comes to defending the 
country and repelling aggression. 
The purpose of our military defence is to render planned exploitation 
of Finnish territory or attack against Finland prohibitively expensive in 
comparison with the expected benefits. Thus, our military defence aims 
at preventing attacks and keeping the country out of war. 
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TERRITORIAL SURVEILLANCE AND PROTECTION OF 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
In surveillance and protection of territorial integrity the Defence Forces 
carry the main responsibility. The Frontier Guard and other authorities 
perform complementary functions in this respect. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is responsible for air 
surveillance. The radar systems are complemented by optical and 
electronic means. Unidentified targets are identified and intercepted by 
fighter planes in constant readiness. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is responsible for sea surveillance. 
It is composed of radar, other electronic and optical observation as well 
as underwater surveillance systems. Naval and Coast Guard ships as 
well as Air Force aircraft are used to identify and repel targets. 
THE DEFENCE OF THE NATION 
In defending the nation against serious aggression, Finnish military 
doctrine is non-offensive, but the defence of Finland will begin at its 
very borders. 
Territorial defence is the main military doctrine of Finland. Its central 
objective is to retain the strategically most important areas. By taking 
advantage of the depth of our territory we aim at delaying and wearing 
down the aggressor so that conditions to repel and defeat the enemy 
can be achieved. By engaging enemy units in both forward combat and 
full-scale guerilla warfare in the rear, opportunities are created to attain 
the goals of the defence. 
Air defence, carried out by the Air Force and anti-aircraft units, strives 
to prevent the aggressor from achieving air superiority and protects 
our most important military forces as well as nationally important 
objects. 
Im maritime defence, the aim is to fully utilize the advantages that the 
unique Finnish archipelago gives to the defender. It is based on fixed 
coastal artillery and effective mine-laying backed up by mobile units. 
Focal areas for operations of the Navy are the inlet of the Gulf of 
Finland and the Åland Islands area. 
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The overall defence planning has been devised with regard to three 
different types of attacks: (1) a surprise attack to subjugate the state, (2) 
an offensive against a third party through Finnish territory, and (3) a 
large-scale attack to invade the country. By maintaining readiness and 
defensive capability flexibly corresponding to each threat situation, the 
use of our territory for the aggressor's purposes can be prevented or 
repelled. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY DEFENCE 
The military doctrines of CSCE States are presently subject to critical 
examination. Finland, for its part, has not felt a need to change its 
strategic thinking. Our doctrine continues to fulfil the requirements of 
our military security and seems to meet the expectations of the 
neighbouring States as well. It gives a clear signal that we are capable of 
preserving the integrity of the Finnish territory. 
Finland is in a process of rationalizing the command and administrative 
system of its military defence. In the beginning of 1993, the country will 
be divided into three regional commands and, subordinate to them, 12 
military areas. By this measure, the total number of regional staffs will 
be reduced by half, from 30 to 15. 
The command and administrative system of the Air Force will remain 
essentially unchanged. There continue to exist three air force wings, 
whose areas of responsibility will coincide with the Army regional 
commands. The Navy will have two operational flotillas. 
The Army remains the bulk of the Finnish Defence Forces. Of its 27 
wartime brigades, two armoured and ten jaeger brigades are the focal 
point in the development. The mobility, fire-power and protection of 
these operational units are presently being significantly improved. 
The Air Force interceptors currently in service will be phased out 
starting from mid-1990s. The procurement authorization needed to 
replace the interceptors is included in next year's budget proposal of 
the Finnish Government. The radar surveillance system is at present 
being renewed and updated with sophisticated long-range equipment. 
In developing the Navy, we continue to further stress the importance of 
mine-laying capacity. Parallel to this, we are improving our capability 
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to repel attacks by procuring fast attack craft and surface-to-surface 
missiles. 
MILITARY SERVICE AND THE WILL TO DEFEND ONE'S COUNTRY 
A thoroughly effective national military service system is the cornerstone 
of Finnish defence. Our territorial defence could not meet its challenges 
without the extensive reserves created by conscription and without the 
strong will to defend the country traditionally prevailing in Finland. 
THE U.N. SERVICE 
Finnish soldiers also continue to contribute to UN peacekeeping 
operations. Since 1957, more than 27,000 Finns have participated in 
such activities. We have trained peacekeepers in co-operation with a 
number of other countries. We are convinced that this kind of expertise 
can be useful in the CSCE context as well. 
SUPPORT FOR THE CSCE PROCESS 
Security can be and has been improved by joint international efforts 
and agreements. Still, in Finland we believe that a small state has to 
take care of itself by maintaining a credible defence. 
As the only body of its kind bringing together all States responsible for 
the continent's security, the CSCE has a key role to play in the 
transforming European security architecture. We are committed to 
participate in this transformation. 
AGREEMENT ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND AND THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho and the First Vice-Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation G.E. Burbulis signed on January 20, 1992 an 
Agreement on the Foundations of Relations Between the Republic of 
Finland and the Russian Federation. Prime Minister Aho and the First 
Vice-Prime Minister Burbulis also exchanged notes, signed by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland Paavo Väyrynen and the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A. F. Kosyrev, stating that 
the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of 1948 
between Finland and the USSR has ceased to be in force. 
Text of the Agreement: 
The Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation, hereafter referred 
to as the Parties, 
emphasizing the significance of the profound historical changes in 
Europe, 
aiming at developing and strengthening good-neighbourly relations 
and comprehensive co-operation between their countries and peoples, 
confirming their participation in the construction of a democratic, 
peaceful and united Europe in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Charter 
of Paris and other documents of the CSCE, 
expressing their wish to work bilaterally and together with other 
countries for the promotion of the welfare of the Arctic region, Northern 
Europe and the Baltic Sea region, 
emphasizing the historical contacts between their peoples and the 
continuing need for open relationships, 
confirming their observance in good faith of the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the rights of national 
minorities and their promotion of human contacts, 
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affording particular importance to the advancement of democracy and 
economic liberty, 
recognizing their responsibility for the preservation of their human 
environment and for global, regional and mutual environmental security, 
manifesting their endeavours to strengthen international peace and 
security as well as to fulfill the principles of justice, fundamental human 
values and sustainable development in pursuance of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 
have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
The relations between the Parties shall be based, in accordance with the 
UN Charter and the Final Act of the CSCE, on principles of international 
law such as sovereign equality, refraining from the threat or use of 
force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement 
of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. The Parties shall fulfill in good faith their 
obligations under international law and promote in the spirit of good 
neighbourliness their partnership in mutual co-operation as well as 
their co-operation with all other states. 
Article 2 
The Parties shall maintain a regular dialogue at the highest state 
leadership and other governmental levels on the progress of their 
countries as well as on issues of mutual and international concern. 
They shall promote relations in different fields between elected 
assemblies as well as between central regional and local public 
authorities. 
They. shall negotiate on issues related to their bilateral relations in a 
constructive spirit and respecting each other's interests. 
Article 3 
The Parties undertake to maintain their common frontier as a frontier 
of good neighbourliness and co-operation, in accordance with the CSCE 
Final Act, respecting its inviolability and each other's territorial integrity. 
Article 4 
The Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the other Party and 
settle their mutual disputes by peaceful means in observance of the UN 
Charter, the CSCE Final Act and other CSCE documents. 
The Parties shall not use, or permit the use of, their territories for armed 
aggression against the other Party. 
In the case of Finland or Russia becoming the object of an armed 
aggression, the other Party shall contribute to the settlement of the 
conflict in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UN 
Charter and CSCE documents and shall refrain from giving any military 
assistance to the aggressor. 
Article 5 
The Parties shall make every effort to strengthen the operational 
capabilities of the United Nations and the CSCE in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. They shall support international efforts 
directed towards disarmament, arms control and confidence and security 
building in the military field. 
In situations where international peace and security, or particularly the 
security of either Party, is endangered, Finland and Russia shall contact 
each other, as necessary, with the purpose of using the means offered 
by the United Nations and the CSCE in the settlement of the conflict. 
Article 6 
The Parties shall devote particular attention to promoting co-operation 
between Finland and the adjacent neighbouring regions of Murmansk, 
Karelia and St. Petersburg. 
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Article 7 
The Parties shall develop their mutual economic and scientific and 
technical co-operation on the basis of the principles of market economy 
and mutual benefit. 
Article 8 
The Parties shall make every effort to advance their co-operation in the 
protection of the environment, in the resolution of environmental 
problems and in the use of natural resources in conformity with the 
principle of sustainable development. 
Article 9 
The Parties shall promote cultural and scientific exchanges based on 
the rich traditions of the mutual interaction among their peoples as 
well as on the common European and human values. 
The Parties shall encourage contacts and interaction among their citizens 
in the spirit of a united Europe. In this context, a special attention shall 
be given to promoting and expanding contacts among the youth. 
They shall create conditions for the expansion of direct contacts between 
individuals, institutions and organizations on the basis of pluralism 
and openness. 
Article 10 
The Parties shall give their support to the preservation of the identity of 
Finns and Finno-Ugric peoples and nationalities in Russia and, 
correspondingly in Finland, the identity of persons originating in Russia. 
They shall protect each other's languages, cultures and historical 
monuments. 
Article 11 
The Parties shall conclude agreements needed to promote the objectives 
of this Agreement. 
Article 12 
This Agreement is subject to ratification and it shall enter into force 
upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. 
The Agreement shall be in force for a period of ten years, after which it 
shall be in force for subsequent periods of five years each, unless one of 
the Parties terminates the Agreement by written notice at least one year 
before the expiry of the period of validity. 
Done in Helsinki on 20 January 1992 in two originals in the Finnish and 
Russian languages both texts being equally valid. 
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